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Patents and the Progress of Science:
Exclusive Rights and Experimental Uset
Rebecca S. Eisenbergtt
The patent laws confer exclusive rights in inventions and dis-
coveries in furtherance of a constitutional purpose "To Promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts."' Yet the idea that exclu-
sive rights in new knowledge will promote scientific progress is
counterintuitive to many observers of research science, who believe
that science advances most rapidly when the community enjoys
free access to new discoveries.2 These divergent perspectives on
how best to promote scientific progress potentially conflict when
subsequent investigators use patented inventions in their research.
In theory, one might expect each of these perspectives to
predominate in its own separate sphere of basic or applied re-
search.3 In the basic research sphere, academic scientists could
publish their discoveries to the scientific community and build on
each other's prior research without fear of infringement liability,
while in the applied research sphere, industrial scientists could
keep their discoveries secret or patent them for exclusive commer-
cial development by their employers. But in practice these two
t Copyright 1989 Rebecca S. Eisenberg
tt Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. I wish to thank Marty Adel-
man, Severin Borenstein, Ed Cooper, Avery Katz, Jim Krier, Rick Lempert, Jeff MacKie-
Mason, Rob Merges, Roger Noll, Sallyanne Payton, Don Regan, and Fred Schauer for help-
ful comments on earlier drafts of this article. I am also grateful to Cathy Bencivengo and
Jeffrey Mills for many hours of research assistance.
1 US Const, Art I, § 8, cl 8.
' See, for example, Robert K. Merton, The Normative Structure of Science, in Robert
K. Merton, The Sociology of Science 267, 273-75 (Chicago, 1973); Jerome R. Ravetz, Scien-
tific Knowledge and its Social Problems 245-59 (Oxford, 1971); Bernard Barber, Science
and the Social Order 90-93 (Free Press, 1952). See also notes 120-207 and accompanying
text.
S By "basic research" I mean research directed solely toward expanding human knowl-
edge, and by "applied research" I mean research directed toward solving practical problems.
See Norman W. Storer, The Social System of Science 106-16 (Holt, Rinehart, 1966); War-
ren 0. Hagstrom, The Scientific Community 108-9 (Basic Books, 1965); William Korn-
hauser, Scientists in Industry: Conflict and Accommodation 16-17 (U Cal, 1963). The oper-
ation of the patent laws has traditionally been confined to applied research. See Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97
Yale L J 177, 184-87 (1987).
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spheres often overlap." The distinction between basic and applied
research is particularly difficult to maintain in contemporary re-
search in the biomedical sciences.5 The biotechnology revolution
has accelerated the commercial development of basic research dis-
coveries and attracted commercial interest in academic biomedical
research in its early stages. Academic and industrial scientists may
thus have a shared interest in developing and using new laboratory
techniques and equipment, or in isolating and developing new
ways of producing proteins that are potentially useful in the study
or treatment of human disease. As a consequence, academic re-
searchers make and patent commercially valuable discoveries, and
researchers in industry make and patent discoveries that are im-
portant to the work of scientists seeking knowledge for its own
sake. Important research discoveries in the biomedical sciences are
increasingly likely to be patented, and the use of these discoveries
in subsequent research is increasingly likely to threaten the com-
mercial interests of patent holders.
If basic research cannot be insulated from the patent system
entirely, it might still be possible to reconcile a system of exclusive
patent rights in prior discoveries with the interest of the scientific
community in allowing subsequent researchers to enjoy free access
to such discoveries by exempting the use of patented inventions in
research from infringement liability. While the United States pat-
ent statute does not provide such an exemption,' the courts have
4 See Kornhauser, Scientists in Industry at 16-17 (cited in note 3); Richard R. Nelson,
The Link Between Science and Invention: The Case of the Transistor, in National Bureau
of Economic Research, The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity 549, 581-83
(Princeton, 1962); Seymour Melman, The Impact of the Patent System on Research, Sub-
comm on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Comm on the Judiciary,
Study No 11, 85th Cong, 2d Sess 7-8 (GPO, 1958).
5 See Eisenberg, 97 Yale L J at 195-97 (cited in note 3).
6 1 refer to the basic utility patent statute codified at 35 USC § 100 et seq (1982). Since
the enactment of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, the
patent statute has provided a limited exemption from infringement liability for those who
make, use, or sell a patented invention "solely for uses reasonably related to the develop-
ment and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture,
use, or sale of drugs." 35 USC § 271(e) (Supp 1986). The courts so far have construed this
provision narrowly. See, for example, Scripps Clinic and Research Foundation v Genentech
Inc., 666 F Supp 1379, 1395 (N D Cal 1987), 678 F Supp 1429 (N D Cal 1988) (discussed at
notes 235-48 and accompanying text). But a recent decision of the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit extending the exemption to clinical testing of medical devices may portend
greater judicial receptiveness to other broadening constructions. See Eli Lilly & Co. v Med-
tronic, Inc., 10 USPQ 2d 1304 (Fed Cir 1989).
Other intellectual property statutes provide broader experimental use exemptions. See,
for example, Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970, 7 USC § 2544 (1982) ("The use and
reproduction of a protected variety for plant breeding or other bona fide research shall not
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long recognized, at least in principle, that a purely "experimental
use" of a patented invention, with no commercial purpose, should
be exempt from infringement liability.' But since the use of pat-
ented inventions in noncommercial research rarely provokes a law-
suit, most of the judicial decisions considering the scope of the ex-
perimental use exemption have involved disputes between
commercial competitors. Within this universe of cases the experi-
mental use defense has been frequently raised but rarely sus-
tained." For the most part, the courts have held that the experi-
constitute an infringement of the protection provided under this chapter"); Semiconductor
Chip Protection Act of 1984, 17 USC § 906(a) (Supp 1986) (exempting from infringement
liability the reproduction of a protected work "solely for the purpose of teaching, analyzing,
or evaluating the concepts or techniques" embodied therein or the creation of an original
work incorporating the results of such analysis or evaluation). See also Atomic Energy Act
of 1946, ch 724, § 11(b), 60 Stat 753, 768 (1946) ("No patent hereafter granted shall confer
any rights with respect to any invention or discovery to the extent that such invention or
discovery is used in the conduct of research or development activities in the fields specified
in section 3 directing Atomic Energy Commission to insure continued conduct of research
and development in fields of [nuclear processes, theory and production of atomic energy]").
This provision was eliminated in a substantial revision of the patent provisions in the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub L No 703, ch 1073, §§ 151-160, 68 Stat 919, 943-48 (1954),
current version codified at 42 USCA §§ 2181-2190 (1982 & Supp 1988).
The patent laws of many other countries, including Japan and most members of the
European Economic Community, recognize an experimental use exemption that is not lim-
ited to specific fields of technology. Stephen A. Bent, et al, Intellectual Property Rights in
Biotechnology Worldwide 342-45 (Stockton, 1987), citing European Community Patent
Convention Art 31(b) (which provides that patent protection shall not extend to "acts done
for experimental purposes relating to the subject-matter of the patented invention"). Ger-
many, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Ireland,
Greece and Spain have either amended their national patent laws to conform with Article
31(b) of the Community Patent Convention or have legislation pending to achieve this ef-
fect. See also Japanese Patent Law of 1978 Art 69(1).
The U.S. copyright laws also exempt some research uses of copyrighted works from
infringement liability under the "fair use" doctrine. 17 USC § 107 (1982) ("the fair use of a
copyrighted work.., for purposes such as ... scholarship, or research, is not an infringe-
ment of copyright"). See also Williams & Wilkins v U.S., 487 F2d 1345, 1362 (Ct Cl 1973)
(holding that the fair use doctrine exempts from copyright infringement liability the photo-
copying of copyrighted articles in medical journals for the use of government medical
researchers).
7 Roche Products, Inc. v Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., 733 F2d 858, 862-63 (Fed Cir 1984);
Pfizer, Inc. v International Rectifier Corp., 217 USPQ 157, 160-61 (C D Cal 1982). See
generally Donald S. Chisum, 4 Patents § 16.03(1) (Bender, 1988); Ronald D. Hantman, Ex-
perimental Use as an Exception to Patent Infringement, 67 J Pat Off Soc'y 617 (1985);
Richard E. Bee, Experimental Use as an Act of Patent Infringement, 39 J Pat Off Soc'y
357 (1957).
s See, for example, Roche Products, 733 F2d at 862-63 (use of patented drug by generic
drug manufacturer in performing clinical tests of drug prior to expiration of patent consti-
tuted patent infringement); Spray Refrigeration Co. v Sea Spray Fishing, Inc., 322 F2d 34,
36-37 (9th Cir 1963) (use of patented apparatus and method for freezing fish "for the pur-
pose of experimentation as to the desirability of using this method" constituted patent in-
fringement where use occurred in course of commercial fishing operation of kind which pat-
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mental use defense does not apply to the facts of the particular
cases before them. As a consequence, the purpose and scope of the
experimental use defense are not well defined. As the use of pat-
ented inventions becomes increasingly important to the progress of
research science and increasingly threatening to the interests of
patent holders, this vaguely defined doctrine is becoming less satis-
factory. The issue has begun to command the attention of the bar,9
commentators,10 and Congress. 1
ent was designed to serve); Pfizer, 217 USPQ at 160-62 (use of patented drug by generic
drug manufacturer in performing clinical tests of drug prior to expiration of patent consti-
tuted patent infringement); Imperial Chem. Ind., PLC v Henkel Corp., 545 F Supp 635, 656
(D Del 1982) (defendant's manufacture of 1200 pounds of patented chemicals for "pilot
plant use" infringed patent where defendant supplied samples to potential customers and
made it known in market that chemicals were commercially available); Northill Co. v Dan-
forth, 51 F Supp 928, 929 (N D Cal 1942) ("Defendant's experiments were evidently not
made for philosophical or amusement purposes but were made in connection with his busi-
ness as a manufacturer and salesman of anchors"); Sprout, Waldron & Co. v Bauer Bros.
Co., 26 F Supp 162, 169 (S D Ohio 1938) ("The defendant cannot escape on the ground of
experimental use where the machines were used to operate upon customers' products in the
ordinary course of business"); R.C.A. v Andrea, 15 F Supp 685, 687 (E D NY 1936), mod'd
on other grounds, 90 F2d 612 (2d Cir 1937) (assembling parts of patented combination to
test them was infringement where assembly was "not a scientific research or an engineering
inquiry" but rather "a step which the defendants apparently deemed necessary in the man-
ufacture and sale of their product"); Pairpearl Prods., Inc. v Joseph H. Meyer Bros., 58 F2d
802, 804 (S D Me 1932) (use of patented process for extracting pearl essence infringed pat-
ent notwithstanding defendant's claim that use was experimental as incident to search for
new agent, where pearl essence extracted through patented process was sold to customers);
Cimiotti Unhairing Co. v Derboklow, 87 F 997, 999 (E D NY 1898) (use of patented ma-
chine for customers "in the ordinary course of business" was patent infringement, notwith-
standing defendant's claim that he was "experimenting" with machines in order to see if he
could improve them); United States Mitis Co. v Carnegie Steel Co., 89 F 343, 351 (W D Pa
1898) (noting that defendant's use of patented invention "was a commercial use, extending
over a period of several months, and involved a very large product"); Bonsack Machine Co.
v Underwood, 73 F 206, 211 (E D NC 1896) (noting that machine "has not been made
simply as an experiment, but has been used for profit, that is, for the purpose of selling the
[defendant's] patent"); Albright v Celluloid Harness-Trimming Co., 1 F Cases 320, 323 (C C
NJ 1877) (holding use of patented invention in trial manufacture "is a technical infringe-
ment, and is sufficient to authorize an injunction restraining [defendant's] future use" but
not sufficient for award of damages); Poppenhusen v Falke, 19 F Cases 1048, 1049 (S D NY
1861) (finding infringement in spite of experimentation claim and noting that defendants
"are rivals of the complainant in the very business to which his patents relate").
See Experimental Use After Roche v Bolar, 1988 ABA Patent, Trademark & Copy-
right Committee Rep at 25-28 (Proposed Resolution 101-4) ("RESOLVED, that the Section
of Patent, Trademark & Copyright Law favors in principle an exemption from infringement
for experimental or research use, not limited to pharmaceutical products, whether or not
such use is conducted by a commercial organization").
'0 See Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property in Higher Life Forms: The Patent Sys-
tem and Controversial Technologies, 47 Md L Rev 1051, 1073-75 (1988); Donald S. Chisum,
The Patentability of Algorithms, 47 U Pitt L Rev 959, 1017-18 (1986); see generally
Hantman, 67 J Pat Off Soc'y 217 (cited in note 7); Ned A. Israelsen, Making, Using and
Selling Without Infringing: An Examination of 35 U.S.C. Section 271(e) and the Experi-
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In this article I analyze the proper scope of an experimental
use exemption from patent infringement liability by comparing the
rationales behind promoting technological progress through grant-
ing exclusive patent rights in inventions with competing arguments
for promoting scientific progress by allowing all investigators to en-
joy free access to the discoveries of other scientists.
I begin by reviewing key features of the patent laws and theo-
retical justifications for granting patent monopolies in order to
clarify the implications of existing patent doctrine and theory for
an experimental use exemption. I then look to the literature in the
sociology, history, and philosophy of science for reasons to permit
researchers to have free access to prior scientific discoveries.
With this background, I offer suggestions on the proper scope
of an experimental use defense in light of the purposes of the pat-
ent laws and the needs of the research science community. I con-
clude by using two recently patented inventions with obvious im-
plications for future biomedical research as examples to illustrate
which research uses should be subject to the control of the patent
holder and which uses should be allowed to proceed without a
license.
I. THE CASE FOR ExCLUsIvE RIGHTS
A. The Experimental Use Exemption in Context
A United States patent confers the exclusive right to make,
use, and sell the invention set forth in the patent claims in the
United States for seventeen years.12 During the term of the patent
the patent holder has the right to stop anyone from using the in-
vention-even an innocent infringer who develops the same inven-
tion independently." Patent holders need not exploit their exclu-
sive rights themselves, but may sell or license them to others in
mental Use Exception to Patent Infringement, 16 AIPLA Q J 457 (1988-89).
" Transgenic Animal Patent Reform Act, HR Rep No 100-888, 100th Cong, 2d Sess 49-
51 (1988) (bill as originally drafted would have exempted from patent infringement liability
the use of patented transgenic animals "solely for research or experimentation without any
commercial intent or purpose"); 134 Cong Rec H 7439 (Sept 13, 1988) (statement of Rep.
Rose in favor of HR 4970).
12 35 USC § 154 (1982).
13 35 USC § 271 (1982); Robert L. Harmon, Patents and the Federal Circuit 110-11
(Bureau of Nat Aff, 1988). Remedies available may be more restricted in the case of inno-
cent infringers. See 35 USC § 287 (1982) (if patent holder or licensees fail to mark patented
articles with word "patent" and number of patent, no damages may be recovered in in-
fringement action except upon proof of continued infringement after actual notice of
patent).
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14exchange for royalties, or even use their patents to suppress the
underlying inventions entirely.15
In exchange for these exclusive rights, the patent statute re-
quires the inventor to disclose the invention in the patent applica-
tion in terms sufficient to enable others who are "skilled in the art"
to make and use it."' This enabling disclosure becomes freely avail-
able to the public as soon as the patent issues; the patent holder
may not thereafter monitor or control access to it.17 Judicial deci-
sions characterize the enabling disclosure in the patent as the
"quid pro quo" of the patent monopoly."8 In order to obtain a pat-
ent, the applicant must first contribute "a measure of worthwhile
knowledge to the public storehouse."19
Although the patent statute on its face grants the patent
holder the unqualified right to exclude others from using the in-
vention until after the patent expires, the timing of the disclosure
requirement suggests that there are limits to the patent holder's
exclusive rights even during the patent term. If the public had ab-
solutely no right to use the disclosure without the patent holder's
consent until after the patent expired, it would make little sense to
require that the disclosure be made freely available to the public at
the outset of the patent term. The fact that the patent statute so
plainly facilitates unauthorized uses of the invention while the pat-
ent is in effect suggests that some such uses are to be permitted.
This inference is fortified by cases recognizing, at least in principle,
that certain experimental uses of patented inventions should not
give rise to infringement liability.2 °
14 35 USC § 261 (1982).
Continental Paper Bag Co. v Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 US 405 (1907).
16 35 USC §§ 111, 112 (1982).
17 See In re Lundak, 773 F2d 1216, 1222-23 (Fed Cir 1985) (by the time patent issues,
materials that are necessary to make and use invention must be freely available to public
without having to get them from patentee, although availability from patentee is adequate
while patent application is pending); See generally White Consol. Indus. v Vega Servo-Con-
trol, 713 F2d 788 (Fed Cir 1983) (disclosure that incorporates trade secret available only by
license from patentee fails to satisfy the statute). But see, Patent and Trademark Office
Proposed Rule on Deposit of Biological Materials § 1.207(b), 53 Fed Reg 39420, 39431
(1988), to be codified at 37 CFR § 1.207(b) (permitting patent holders who deposit biological
materials with independent depository in satisfaction of patent disclosure requirement to
monitor access to the deposit by contracting with the depository to notify depositor of any
request for the materials along with the name and address of the party to whom the sample
was furnished).
Is See generally United States v Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 US 178, 186-87 (1933);
Grant v Raymond, 31 US (6 Pet) 218, 247 (1832).
" Application of Argoudelis, 434 F2d 1390, 1394 (Ct Cust Pa 1970) (Baldwin
concurring).
20 See cases cited in notes 7-8.
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The experimental use defense first appeared in dictum in the
1813 case of Whittemore v Cutter.21 The author of the opinion,
Justice Story, observed that "it could never have been the inten-
tion of the legislature to punish a man, who constructed a [pat-
ented] machine merely for philosophical experiments, or for the
purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of the machine to produce
its described effects."2 Subsequent courts have consistently recog-
nized the existence of an experimental use defense in theory, al-
though the defense has almost never succeeded in practice.
Recent case law suggests that the experimental use defense
may be available only for "pure" research with no commercial im-
plications. In Roche Products v Bolar Pharmaceutical Co.,25 the
Federal Circuit rejected the argument of a generic drug manufac-
turer that the defense applied to its use of a patented drug during
the patent term to conduct clinical tests. The purpose of the tests
was to gather data necessary to obtain FDA approval to market a
generic version of the drug as soon as the patent expired. Charac-
terizing the experimental use defense as "truly narrow," the court
noted that the defendant's use of the drug was "no dilettante affair
such as Justice Story envisioned. '24 The court held that the de-
fense does not permit "unlicensed experiments conducted with a
view to the adaption of the patented invention to the experi-
mentor's business," as opposed to experiments conducted "for
amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical in-
quiry.''25 This language suggests that under the present state of the
law the defense is unavailable whenever the defendant's research is
motivated by a commercial purpose. As a practical matter, this
could be a very significant limitation on the defense in fields of
research with commercial significance, in which even academic re-
search will often be motivated at least in part by commercial inter-
ests. 26 At the same time, this formulation of the exemption may be
21 29 F Cases 1120 (D Mass 1813).
22 Id at 1121.
" 733 F2d 858 (Fed Cir 1984).
24 Id at 863.
25 Id. Congress has since abrogated the rule of Roche insofar as it pertains to generic
drug manufacturers, but left the experimental use aspect of the decision intact. 35 USC §
271(e). See note 6.
" Academic researchers whose work is funded by industry are likely to be motivated by
"philosophical" and "commercial" interests at the same time. Even in government-spon-
sored academic research, universities and researchers stand to profit by making and patent-
ing commercially valuable discoveries, creating an incentive for researchers to keep an eye
out for potential commercial applications of their work. See generally Eisenberg, 97 Yale L J
at 195-97 (cited in note 3).
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quite broad in the case of research technology inventions with sig-
nificant markets among "strictly philosophical" researchers, de-
priving some patent holders of the opportunity to collect royalties
from a sizable fraction of their potential customers.
B. Exclusive Rights in Exchange for Invention and Disclosure
In order to assess the wisdom of exempting the use of pat-
ented inventions in research from the scope of the patent monop-
oly, it is first necessary to understand exactly how patent monopo-
lies function to promote progress. It makes little sense to create or
expand exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by patents if
such exceptions would undermine essential functions of the patent
system.
The United States Constitution posits an instrumental justifi-
cation for patents, allowing Congress to enact patent legislation for
the specific purpose of promoting scientific progress. In analyzing
how patents promote scientific progress, the courts have empha-
sized two mechanisms: first, the prospect of obtaining a patent mo-
nopoly provides an incentive to invest in research to make new in-
ventions; and second, the patent system promotes disclosure of
new inventions and thereby enlarges the public storehouse of
knowledge.2 8 Both of these theories have been elaborated and chal-
lenged in the economics literature. 9
1. Incentive to invent.
The incentive to invent theory holds that too few inventions
will be made in the absence of patent protection because inven-
I US Const, Art I, § 8, cl 8. This instrumental justification is distinct from moral argu-
ments for patent protection advanced in some European countries, notably France, in the
nineteenth century, such as the argument that inventors have a natural property right in
their ideas that society is morally obligated to recognize. See generally Fritz Machlup and
Edith Penrose, The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth Century, 10 J Econ Hist 1, 10-20
(1950). The framers of the United States Constitution rejected the notion that inventors
have a natural property right in their inventions. Thus Thomas Jefferson wrote:
Inventions then cannot, in nature, be a subject of property. Society may give an exclu-
sive right to the profits arising from them, as an encouragement to men to pursue ideas
which may produce utilities, but this may or may not be done according to the will and
convenience of society, without claim or complaint from anybody.
See Walter Hamilton, Investigation of Concentration of Economic Power: Patents & Free
Enterprise 21 (TNEC Monograph No 31) (GPO, 1941) (quoting Thomas Jefferson).
I8 Kewanee Oil Co. v Bicron, 416 US 470, 480-81 (1974).
29 A third theory, that patents promote "innovation" or investment in the commercial
development of inventions, has been advanced by some commentators but has received little
attention from the courts. See notes 81-118 and accompanying text.
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tions once made are easily appropriated by competitors of the orig-
inal inventor who have not shared in the costs of invention." If
successful inventions are quickly imitated by free riders, competi-
tion will drive prices down to a point where the inventor receives
no return on the original investment in research and develop-
ment.31 As a result, the original inventor may be unable to appro-
priate enough of the social value of the invention to justify the
initial research and development expenditures.32 The high risk in-
volved in research compounds the likelihood of underinvestment in
invention. 3 Thus inventions with potentially great social benefits
might never come about, or at least might be significantly delayed,
unless private returns to invention were increased above their free
market levels. Patents serve to bring the private benefits of inven-
30 See Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Patent and Antitrust Law 2-3 (Chicago, 1973); Frederic
M. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance 379-99 (Rand Mc-
Nally, 1970); John S. McGee, Patent Exploitation: Some Economic and Legal Problems, 9 J
L & Econ 135 (1966); Dan Usher, The Welfare Economics of Invention, 31 Economica 279
(1964); Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Inven-
tion, in Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity at 609 (cited in note 4); Richard R. Nel-
son, The Economics of Invention: A Survey of the Literature, 32 J Bus 101 (1959); Fritz
Machlup, An Economic Review of the Patent System, Subcomm on Patents, Trademarks,
and Copyrights of the Senate Comm on the Judiciary, Study No 15, 85th Cong, 2d Sess
(GPO, 1958); Machlup and Penrose, 10 J Econ Hist at 20-25 (cited in note 27); Michael
Polanyi, Patent Reform, 11 Rev of Econ Studies 61 (1944); Arnold Plant, The Economic
Theory Concerning Patents for Inventions, 1 Economica 30 (1934).
31 The costs of research and development leading to a new invention are one-time,
"sunk" costs. Once the invention has been made and disclosed, the marginal cost of using
more intensively the knowledge gained through prior research is zero. There may still be
other variable costs associated with producing goods and services through use of the inven-
tion, such as costs for labor and materials, but the invention cost is fixed in the past and
need not be incurred again no matter how intensively the invention is used. In a competitive
market in which anyone is free to use the invention to produce goods without obligation to
the inventor, the cost of the goods sold will be driven down to a price approaching the
marginal cost of their production, and thus the selling price will not allow for any return on
the sunk cost of the research and development necessary to make the invention in the first
place. See Machlup, Subcomm on Patents, Study No 15 at 58-59 (cited in note 30).
" See Scherer, Industrial Market Structure at 384 (cited in note 30); William F. Bax-
ter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An Economic Analysis, 76
Yale L J 267, 268-69 (1966); Machlup, Subcomm on Patents, Study No 15 at 57-58 (cited in
note 30).
33 Arrow, Economic Welfare at 614-15 (cited in note 30); Richard R. Nelson, The Sim-
ple Economics of Basic Scientific Research, 67 J Pol Econ 297 (1959). Arrow suggests that
since the output of inventive effort is uncertain, and since there is no adequate market
mechanism for shifting this risk, risk aversion can be expected to lead to underinvestment
in invention. Arrow, Economic Welfare at 611-14, 616. McGee argues that inventors may
display risk preference and therefore overinvest in inventive activity. McGee, 9 J L Econ at
136 (cited in note 30). See Edwin Mansfield, et al, Research and Innovation in the Modern
Corporation 18-63 (Norton, 1971) (finding that firms tend to invest only in R&D projects
with high estimated probability of success, but that firms tend to overpredict success).
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tions in line with their social value by allowing inventors to use
their monopoly positions to extract a price that more closely ap-
proaches the value that users receive from inventions.3 4
Challenges to the incentive to invent justification for patents
have taken a variety of forms. The most fundamental objection is
that subjecting new inventions to monopoly control restricts their
use and thereby reduces the social benefits of patented inven-
tions.35 It is open to question whether it is necessary to endure the
output-restricting effects of patent monopolies in order to stimu-
late invention. 6 In some cases the head start advantage gained by
being first in the market with a new invention may provide a suffi-
cient incentive to promote investment in research.37 Similarly, the
need to keep up with the technological progress of market rivals
1, See Baxter, 76 Yale L J at 270 (cited in note 32). An extreme version of this argu-
ment (attributed to John Stuart Mill) is that a patent holder can never use the patent
monopoly to extract more than the value of the inventor's efforts to society, since consumers
will pay the patent holder no more than the invention is worth to them. See Machlup and
Penrose, 10 J Econ Hist at 20 (cited in note 27). This argument rests on the often dubious
assumption that the invention would never have been made were it not for the efforts of the
inventor who patented it. If instead one assumes that somebody else would eventually have
made the same invention, it is no longer clearly appropriate to attribute the full social value
of the invention to the efforts of the first inventor. See Bowman, Patent and Antitrust Law
at 17 (cited in note 30).
"I See Scherer, Industrial Market Structure at 382 (cited in note 30); Baxter, 76 Yale L
J at 270, 274 (cited in note 32); Machlup, Subcomm on Patents, Study No 15 at 55, 63 (cited
in note 30); Polanyi, 11 Rev of Econ Studies at 62 (cited in note 30).
" Some critics of the patent system have suggested that government could stimulate
invention at less social cost by awarding prizes to inventors in lieu of patents. See, for exam-
ple, Polanyi, 11 Rev of Econ Studies at 65 (cited in note 30). Machlup states that such
proposals for alternatives to patents are almost as old as the patent system, and notes that
James Madison proposed a system of prizes and bonuses to inventors in lieu of patents at
the Constitutional Convention in 1787. Machlup, Subcomm on Patents, Study No 15 at 15 n
83 (cited in note 30); see also Hamilton, Patents and Free Enterprise at 24-25 (cited in note
27).
Others have argued that inventions arise inevitably with or without government incen-
tives when the state of basic knowledge and other social conditions become favorable. See
Abbott P. Usher, A History of Mechanical Inventions 1-31 (McGraw Hill, 1929); S.C. Gilfil-
lan, The Sociology of Invention 71-78 (Follett, 1935); William F. Ogburn, Social Change 86
(Huebsch, 1923); Machlup, Subcomm on Patents, Study No 15 at 23 n 120, 24 n 127 (cited
in note 30); Alfred E. Kahn, Fundamental Deficiencies of the American Patent Law, 30 Am
Econ Rev 475, 479-81 (1940).
S7 Scherer, Industrial Market Structure at 384-87 (cited in note 30); Machlup, Sub-
comm on Patents, Study No 15 at 23 n 121, 24 n 128, 38-39 and sources cited therein, 59-60
(cited in note 30). See generally Jack Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of Informa-
tion and the Reward to Inventive Activity, 61 Am Econ Rev 561 (1971) (arguing that apart
from the profits obtained from patents, innovators may profit by using their advance knowl-
edge, or "foreknowledge," of new technologies to speculate in assets whose value will be
affected by the release of the new technology).
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might stimulate invention without further incentives," or non-pat-
ent barriers to market entry may give enough protection from com-
petition to make research and development profitable without
patents."
Another objection to the incentive to invent justification is
that patent incentives may distort economic activity in ways that
undermine efficiency. For example, competing firms hoping to
make patentable inventions ahead of their rivals in order to win
lucrative patents may spend too much money trying to develop in-
ventions quickly, when the same result could be achieved at less
social cost through a less accelerated research effort.40 The patent
system may divert too many resources away from productive activ-
ities in which returns are limited by the forces of competition,4' or
it may divert resources from research in fields where patent protec-
tion is unavailable to research that is more likely to yield profitable
patent monopolies.42
Finally, some writers have argued that the patent system may
hinder progress through its effects on the research efforts of per-
sons other than the patent holder. The existence of a patent may
undermine the incentives of these other persons to make improve-
ments in patented technologies.4 3 Worse yet, it may force competi-
" Scherer, Industrial Market Structure at 386 (cited in note 30); Machlup, Subcomm
on Patents, Study No 15 at 38-39 (cited in note 30).
3' Scherer, Industrial Market Structure at 387 (cited in note 30); see Arrow, Economic
Welfare at 619-22 (cited in note 30) (arguing that if the problem of appropriability is ig-
nored, firms in a competitive market will have a greater incentive to invent than would a
monopolist because the competitive firm's incentive is equal to the full cost reduction on the
competitive output, while the monopolist's incentive is diminished by the set-off of
preinvention monopoly profits).
40 Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 54 (Little, Brown, 2d ed 1977); Yoram
Barzel, The Optimal Timing of Innovations, 50 Rev Econ & Stat 348 (1968).
'" Machlup, Subcomm on Patents, Study No 15 at 45-50 (cited in note 30) and sources
cited therein; Plant, 1 Economica at 40-42 (cited in note 30).
4 McGee, 9 J L & Econ at 137 (cited in note 30); Plant, 1 Economica at 45-46 (cited in
note 30).
4' Scherer, Industrial Market Structure at 392 (cited in note 30); Baxter, 76 Yale L J
at 270 (cited in note 32); Machlup, Subcomm on Patents, Study No 15 at 64 (cited in note
30); Kahn, 30 Am Econ Rev at 482 (cited in note 36); Plant, 1 Economica at 46 (cited in
note 30). Edmund Kitch argues that this particular effect of the patent monopoly promotes
efficiency in research. See notes 97-116 and accompanying text.
The essence of the argument that patents undermine the incentives of persons other
than the patent holders to make improvements in patented inventions is that once an inven-
tion is patented, only the patent holder and her licensees are able to reap rewards in the
market for research leading to further refinements in the invention, while in the absence of
patents competitors would also stand to benefit from such research. This argument over-
looks the fact that the value of the improvement to the patent holder and her licensees
might still give other researchers an incentive to develop it. See text at note 118.
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tors of the patent holder to waste time and effort finding duplica-
tive solutions to technological problems in order to avoid
infringement.44
2. Incentive to disclose.
-1.
The incentive to disclose argument, which has been more pop-
ular with the courts than with commentators, rests on the premise
that in the absence of patent protection inventors would keep their
inventions secret in order to prevent competitors from exploiting
them.45 Secrecy prevents the public from gaining the full benefit of
new knowledge and leads to wasteful duplicative research. 6
Economists have questioned whether patents in fact promote
44 Judicial opinions often cite the incentive to invent around patents as a positive bene-
fit of the patent system, reasoning that inventing around patents requires further research
and thus stimulates further progress. See, for example, Yarway Corp. v Eur-Control USA,
775 F2d 268, 277 (Fed Cir 1985); State Indus. v A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F2d 1226, 1236 (Fed
Cir 1985); Kimberly-Clark Corp. v Johnson & Johnson, 745 F2d 1437 (Fed Cir 1984). See
also John C. Stedman, Invention and Public Policy, 12 J L & Contemp Probs 649, 662
(1947).
But some commentators argue that inventing around patents is socially wasteful in that
it diverts resources from other productive uses to the task of finding redundant solutions to
already solved problems. See, for example, Donald F. Turner, The Patent System and Com-
petitive Policy, 44 NYU L Rev 449, 455 (1969); Machlup, Subcomm on Patents, Study No
15 at 51 (cited in note 30). Machlup argues that research to find duplicative solutions to
problems is particularly wasteful when done by the holder of the patent on the first solution
in order to prevent competitors from inventing around the patent. Id. See Bowman, Patent
and Antitrust Law at 21-22 (cited in note 30) (arguing that inventing around patents is not
necessarily socially wasteful if it leads to the development of superior products or processes,
and that it is reasonable to assume that those who incur the costs of inventing around pat-
ents foresee inventing superior substitutes); Scherer, Industrial Market Structure at 386-87
(cited in note 30) (noting that although the pace of technological advance has probably been
accelerated in some fields by efforts to invent around patented technologies, resources de-
voted to circumventing patents might otherwise be allocated to activities with "higher social
incremental payoffs"); Martin J. Adelman, The Supreme Court, Market Structure and In-
novation: Chakrabarty, Rohm and Haas, 27 Antitrust Bull 457, 464 (1982) (arguing that
efforts to invent around patent are unlikely to occur unless competitor and patent holder
have different views of cost of developing alternative technology and thus are unable to
agree on royalty for use of patented technology that makes it uneconomic to develop an
alternative).
" Universal Oil Prods. Co. v Globe Oil & Ref. Co., 322 US 471, 484 (1944); Grant v
Raymond, 31 US 218, 247 (1832); Sinclair & Carroll Co. v Interchemical Corp., 325 US 327,
331 (1945); Cross v Iizuka, 753 F2d 1040, 1046 (Fed Cir 1985); Flick-Reedy Corp. v Hydro-
Line Mfg. Co., 351 F2d 546, 550-51 (7th Cir 1965); Bowman, Patent and Antitrust Law at
12-13 (cited in note 30); S.C. Gilfillan, The Root of Patents, or Squaring Patents by Their
Roots, 31 J Pat Off Soc'y 611, 612 (1949) (deriding "disclosure incentive" as "minor motive"
for granting patents and one falling "outside the root of patents").
4" Martin J. Adelman, Property Rights Theory and Patent-Antitrust: The Role of
Compulsory Licensing, 52 NYU L Rev 977, 982 (1977).
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disclosure of inventions that would otherwise be kept secret." Se-
crecy is not always a practical strategy for protection,48 and often
secret technologies can eventually be uncovered through reverse
engineering.49 Where long term secrecy is feasible, patent protec-
tion for a mere seventeen years might not be an attractive alterna-
tive.50 Moreover, any technology that can be exploited in secrecy
by its inventor can probably also be exploited in secrecy by an in-
fringer, making a patent on such an invention difficult to enforce. 51
Finally, some people have questioned whether patent disclosures in
fact convey enough information to be useful to the public.5 2 The
proposition that patents promote disclosure of new inventions by
rewarding those who disclose their inventions in patent applica-
tions is thus open to doubt on a number of grounds.
Nonetheless, it seems likely that the patent system at least fa-
cilitates disclosure by creating rights in inventions that survive dis-
closure. Secrecy makes it difficult for inventors to sell or license
their inventions to others because it is difficult to persuade some-
one to pay for an idea without disclosing it, yet once the invention
is disclosed, the inventor has nothing left to sell. 3 The patent sys-
tem solves this problem by permitting inventors to disclose their
'4 See Scherer, Industrial Market Structure at 381 (cited in note 30); Machiup, Sub-
comm on Patents, Study No 15 at 32-33, 53, 76 (cited in note 30). See also Canada Dep't. of
Consumer & Corp. Affairs, Working Paper on Patent Law Revision 40-42 (1976) ("Canada
Working Paper").
4' Secrecy is impractical when efficient exploitation of the invention requires communi-
cation to a large number of firms. See Bowman, Patent and Antitrust Law at 13 (cited in
note 30).
" Plant, 1 Economica at 44 (cited in note 30). See generally Paulik v Rizkalla, 760 F2d
1270, 1276 (Fed Cir 1985) ("[I]t is a rare invention that cannot be deciphered more readily
from its commercial embodiment than from the printed patent").
50 Bowman, Patent and Antitrust Law at 13 (cited in note 30).
" Eisenberg, 97 Yale L J at 215 (cited in note 3).
"2 Critics of the patent system charge that patent applicants often deliberately with-
hold important information from patent specifications so that they may continue to protect
their "know-how" through trade secrecy. See, for example, Brenner v Manson, 383 US 519,
533-34 (1966). See also Canada Working Paper, at 50-53 (cited in note 47); Machlup, Sub-
comm on Patents, Study No 15 at 32-33 (cited in note 30); William D. Nordhaus, Invention,
Growth, and Welfare: A Theoretical Treatment of Technological Change 89 (MIT, 1969)
("It is well known that a firm tries not to disclose key parts of the invention in order to
reduce the chance of imitation, thereby reducing the effective diffusion of knowledge"); S.C.
Gilfillan, Invention and the Patent System 61 (GPO, 1964) ("The information disclosed in
patents is often not enough, taken by itself, to be of much use to the receiver"); Barkev S.
Sanders, Joseph Rossman, and L. James Harris, Attitudes of Assignees Toward Patented
Inventions, 2 Pat, Trademark & Copyright J Res & Educ 463, 467-68 (Dec 1958) (estimating
that about one-half of patented inventions cannot be used without supplementary know-
how).
" See Arrow, Economic Welfare at 615 (cited in note 30).
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patented inventions to potential users without losing their exclu-
sive rights. If persons receiving disclosure use patented inventions
without permission, the patent holders may sue them for
infringement."
3. Implications for a research exemption to the patent
monopoly.
Neither the incentive to invent theory nor the incentive to dis-
close theory offers any clear guidance in formulating a research ex-
emption from infringement liability. One source of difficulty is that
the cases and literature elaborating these theories have focused
primarily on commercial applications of new technology rather
than on basic scientific research. Indeed, many of the commenta-
tors cited herein distinguish the development of inventions in ap-
plied technology from basic scientific research and explicitly ex-
clude the latter from their analysis."5 It is thus unclear how far it is
appropriate to extend these theories in analyzing the role of pat-
ents in research.
A more serious limitation, not limited to the specific question
of whether to exempt research uses from infringement liability, is
that neither of these theories supplies an answer to the empirical
question of how much incentive is necessary for an optimal level of
invention and disclosure.8 6 One might assume that, other things
being equal, reducing the strength of patents would reduce incen-
tives to make and disclose new inventions and that, conversely, in-
creasing the strength of patents would increase incentives to make
new inventions and to patent them in lieu of protecting them as
trade secrets. But the magnitude of these effects is uncertain.
Moreover, it is difficult to say whether the current level of incen-
tives is too high or too low. 7
Nor does either theory suggest a basis for distinguishing a re-
Polanyi, 11 Rev of Econ Studies at 64 (cited in note 30). See also Edmund W. Kitch,
The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J L & Econ 265, 277-78 (1977) (assert-
ing that patent law defines a framework of legal relations among firms to facilitate disclos-
ure, licensing, etc).
11 See, for example, Nelson, 32 J Bus at 105 (cited in note 30); Machlup, Subcomm on
Patents, Study No 15 at 1 (cited in note 30); Polanyi, 11 Rev of Econ Studies at 75 (cited in
note 30).
"' See generally Machlup, Subcomm on Patents, Study No 15 at 62-73 (cited in note
30) (discussing difficulties involved in analyzing impact on incentives of one-year change in
patent term).
11 Baxter, 76 Yale L J at 268-69 (cited in note 32); McGee, 9 J L & Econ at 136 (cited
in note 30).
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search exemption from other ways of reducing the strength of pat-
ents, such as restricting the scope of patent rights or reducing the
duration of the patent term. The incentive to invent and incentive
to disclose arguments are analytical dead ends for those seeking to
fine tune the patent laws. They offer no guidance in evaluating the
relative merits of different packages of patent rights apart from
suggesting a comparison, if this were possible, of the overall
strength of the incentives the different packages create. Thus the
question of whether to exempt research users from infringement
liability is quickly reduced to the empirical question of whether
doing so would undermine the strength of patent incentives to an
undesirable degree.
There is considerable empirical evidence suggesting that tech-
nological change has been an extremely important source of eco-
nomic growth over time 5 and that levels of invention are respon-
sive to economic stimuli.59 But it does not necessarily follow that
patent protection is necessary to preserve adequate economic in-
centives for invention and innovation.
Eric Schiff has compared the historical record of industrial de-
velopment of countries with and without patent systems during
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, finding little evi-
dence that the lack of a patent system hampered industrializa-
58 See, for example, Moses Abramovitz, Resource and Output Trends in the U.S. Since
1870, 46 Am Econ Rev 5 (1956) (Amer Econ Assoc Papers and Proceedings); Robert M.
Solow, Technological Change and the Aggregate Production Function, 39 Rev Econ & Stat
312, 320 (1957) (estimating that approximately 80 percent of the growth in nonfarm output
per worker in the United States between 1909 and 1949 was attributable to technological
change rather than increased capital intensity); Edward F. Denison, The Sources of Eco-
nomic Growth in the United States and the Alternatives Before Us 271-72 (Brookings Inst,
1962) (estimating that 36 percent of the rise in output per worker between 1929 and 1957
was attributable to the advance of scientific and technological knowledge); Edward F. Deni-
son, Accounting for United States Economic Growth, 1929-69 128 (Brookings Inst, 1974)
(estimating that 27 percent of U.S. economic growth between 1929 and 1969 was attributa-
ble to advances in knowledge); Frederic M. Scherer, Inter-Industry Technology Flows and
Productivity Growth, 64 Rev Econ & Stat 627 (1982) (estimating that in the post-War era
R&D has added to the rate of growth by about one percentage point per year, or about half
of the annual rate of growth in productivity).
" See generally Jacob Schmookler, Invention and Economic Growth (Harvard, 1966)
(finding strong correlation between level of invention as measured by patent statistics and
level of investment in capital goods, with peaks and troughs in invention tending to precede
rather than to follow peaks and troughs in investment, and concluding that patented inven-
tions are made in response to rising demand in an industry); Edwin Mansfield, et al, Re-
search and Innovation (cited in note 33) (showing correlation between research and devel-
opment funds expended and expected success of a research project and profitability of its
results, and showing that timing of research and development and innovation are responsive
to profit expectations).
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tion. 0 But the two countries he studied that did not have patent
systems-the Netherlands and Switzerland-may have been free
riding on domestic and foreign inventions that were stimulated by
patent protection abroad.6 ' Other studies have attempted to deter-
mine, through interviews and questionnaires, the impact of patent
incentives on research and- development (R&D) decision making in
firms. C.T. Taylor and Z.A. Silberston, in their study of the eco-
nomic impact of the patent system in the United Kingdom, found
that the importance of patent protection to the R&D decision
making of firms varied across industries e.6  They found that patent
protection had a strong influence on the willingness of pharmaceu-
tical firms to invest in research and development, but had no more
than a marginal impact on R&D expenditures in the basic chemi-
cals industry. 3 In a similar study of U.S. firms, F.M. Scherer found
that respondents did not consider patents to be particulary impor-
tant in R&D decision making-except when patent lawyers pre-
pared the responses.6" Nonetheless, the authors of both studies in-
terpreted their results to suggest that weakening patent protection
by providing for compulsory licensing of patented inventions on
reasonable terms would lead to greater reliance by firms on secrecy
instead of patent protection. 5
'0 Eric Schiff, Industrialization Without National Patents 34-41, 96-106 (Princeton,
1971). Schiff's study focuses on the experiences of the Netherlands, which abolished its pat-
ent system in 1869 and did not replace it until 1912, and Switzerland, which did not intro-
duce a comprehensive patent system until 1907. Id at 14-15.
6- Id at 23-24, 102-04. During the period under study, citizens of both Switzerland and
the Netherlands were eligible for foreign patent protection under the national patent laws of
other countries. Id at 21-23.
Schiff found a marked increase in the number of foreign patent applications filed by
Dutch citizens after the Netherlands introduced its own patent system, which he interprets
as evidence that the availability of patent protection in the Netherlands stimulated an in-
crease in domestic inventive efforts. Id at 42-51. Scherer suggests a different interpretation
of Schiff's data: the passage of a Dutch patent law may have made Dutch citizens more
patent-conscious and induced the growth of patent law firms, leading to more patenting
abroad of inventions that might have been made with or without patent protection. Frederic
M. Scherer, The Economic Effects of Compulsory Licensing 36-37 (NYU, 1977).
62 C.T. Taylor and Z.A. Silberston, The Economic Impact of the Patent System 331-50
(Cambridge, 1973).
'3 Attempting to explain this difference, they noted that research expenditures are
higher relative to sales volume in the pharmaceutical industry than in the chemical indus-
try, that there are more non-patent barriers to competition in the chemical industry, that
patents provide stronger protection in the pharmaceutical field than in the chemical field
because of the relative ease of inventing around chemical patents, and that secrecy is not
practical in the pharmaceutical industry. Id at 332-36.
Scherer, Compulsory Licensing at 52-62 (cited in note 61).
"5 Id at 62; C.T. Taylor and Z.A. Silberston, Economic Impact at 210-13, 352 (cited in
note 62).
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Another empirical approach to determining the adequacy of
the current level of patent incentives is to measure the difference
between private and social rates of return to investments in re-
search and development. In case studies of seventeen industrial in-
novations, Edwin Mansfield and his colleagues found that the me-
dian estimated social rate of return to investment in R&D was 56
percent, while the median private rate of return was about 25 per-
cent.6 According to the study, "in about 30% of the cases, the pri-
vate rate of return was so low that with the benefit of hindsight no
firm would have invested in the innovation, but the social rate of
return was so high that from society's standpoint the investment
was entirely worthwhile. 87 While the authors caution against
drawing any inferences about the extent of underinvestment in re-
search and development from their results, 8 the data are certainly
consistent with the view that the current level of incentives to
make and disclose new inventions is if anything too low. Other
studies have tentatively suggested that private rates of return from
investments in research and development are significantly higher
than returns available on other investments, 9 offering further evi-
dence that firms underinvest in research and development.
If one assumes that the level of incentives provided by an un-
qualified seventeen year patent monopoly is either optimal or too
low, then it arguably follows that the use of a patented invention
in research should only be exempt from infringement liability
when it has no adverse impact on the patent holder's profits.7 0 A
broader exemption would reduce the value of the patent monopoly
and thereby reduce incentives to make and disclose new inven-
tions. Without articulating this rationale, some courts seem to have
taken approximately this position on the proper scope of the ex-
perimental use defense.
A few early cases that considered the experimental use defense
stated that it should only be available when use of a patented in-
66 Edwin Mansfield, et al, Social and Private Rates of Return from Industrial Innova-
tions, 91 Q J Econ 221, 233-34 (1977).
" Id at 235. The gap between social and private rates of return was larger for more
important innovations and for innovations that could be imitated at small cost by competi-
tors. Id at 237.
6 Id at 240.
*' See, for example, Edwin Mansfield, Industrial Research and Technological Innova-
tion 65-80 (Norton, 1968).
70 Alternatively, one might argue that the profitability of patents should be increased in
some other manner, such as by lengthening the patent term, in order to compensate for any
reduction in the value of patents from the introduction of an experimental use exemption.
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vention in research causes no "harm" to the patent holder. 1 Limit-
ing the defense in this way presents several problems. The no-
harm approach to experimental use seems to rest on the erroneous
premise that research scientists who use patented inventions in
purely non-commercial research, or in research that does not com-
pete with the commercial interests of the patent holder, cause no
"harm" to the patent holder. However, any unlicensed use of a
patented invention harms the patent holder if the user would oth-
erwise have paid a royalty for the use. The question of whether an
unlicensed use has "harmed" the patent holder thus leads right
back to the question of whether the user should have paid for a
license. Ironically, a no-harm limitation would seem to confine the
defense to situations in which it is unnecessary, since patent hold-
ers are unlikely to bring infringement actions unless they feel
harmed by the defendants' conduct. Moreover, the fact that a de-
fendant's use of a patented invention has caused no harm to the
plaintiff is not ordinarily a defense to a patent infringement
claim.7 2
The 1890 Robinson patent treatise, which the courts have con-
tinued to cite in experimental use cases into the 1980's,73 offers a
slightly more refined version of the no-harm standard, asserting
that the use of an invention should not constitute infringement un-
less it is "hostile to the interest of the patentee.., represented by
the emoluments which he does or might receive from the practice
of the invention by himself or others. '7 4 According to this view of
"experimental use," where the use of an invention in research pro-
duces "no pecuniary result" the patent holder has not lost any of
her "emoluments" and her interests are not antagonized. On the
other hand, if the user conducts experiments with a view to adapt-
ing the invention to a business purpose, the use constitutes in-
fringement, and "even experimental uses will be sometimes en-
joined though no injury may have resulted. 7 5 Consistent with this
approach, the courts have generally refused to recognize an experi-
mental use exemption for research performed by commercial
71 See, for example, Byam v Bullard, 4 F Cases 934, 935 (D Mass 1852); Albright, 1 F
Cases at 323.
71 Roche Products, 733 F2d at 861; see generally Stickle v Heublein, Inc., 716 F2d 1550
(Fed Cir 1983). See also Eisenberg, 97 Yale L J at 221 n 231 (cited in note 3).
73 See Roche Products, 733 F2d at 862; RCA v Andrea, 15 F Supp 685, 686-87; Ruth v
Stearns-Roger Mfg. Co., 13 F Supp 697, 713 (D Colo 1935).
7' William C. Robinson, The Law of Patents for Useful Inventions § 898 at 55-56 (Lit-
tle, Brown, 1890).
75 Id.
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firms.7 6
This definition of experimental use refines the no-harm stan-
dard by drawing a distinction between commercial and noncom-
mercial research. While this distinction might appear to be an ap-
propriate place to draw the line between research uses that should
trigger infringement liability and those that should be protected
from liability by an experimental use exemption, the difference be-
tween commercial and noncommercial research in fact often has
little to do with the financial interests of patent holders.
An isolated use of a patented invention in purely academic re-
search with no commercial implications might have little impact
on the profitability of the patent, assuming that in the absence of
an exemption the researcher would forego use of the invention
rather than obtaining a license. But for inventions with significant
markets among researchers, such as patented laboratory tech-
niques and other research tools,7 7 exempting even purely academic
researchers from the patent monopoly could deprive patent hold-
ers of a portion of the monopoly profits they might otherwise ex-
pect to earn and thereby reduce incentives to make and disclose
such inventions in the future. Research users are ordinary consum-
ers of such an invention. To exempt such users from infringement
liability would plainly undermine the interest of the patent holder
in "the emoluments which he might receive from the practice of
the invention by others. ' 7 8 In this context the incentives justifica-
tion for patents suggests that researchers, like other consumers,
should be required to pay royalties to the developers of inventions
that are useful to them in order to maintain a level of incentives
that is adequate to justify developing such inventions.
An incentives analysis also argues against an exemption for re-
search users who are potential competitors of the patent holder
rather than potential customers. For example, consider the case of
71 See cases cited in note 8.
77 Of course, in the case of a product invention such as a patented laboratory machine,
anyone who buys the product after it was made under authorization of the patent holder
has an implied license to use the invention embodied in the product. See U. S. o Univis
Lens Co., 316 US 241, 249 (1942) ("[T]he authorized sale of an article which is capable of
use only in practicing the patent is a relinquishment of the patent monopoly with respect to
the article sold."). The same principle applies to an authorized sale of items especially
adapted for use in a patented process-the purchaser has an implied license to use the items
to perform the patented process. See, for example, Met-Coil Sys. Corp. v Korners Unlim-
ited, Inc. 803 F2d 684 (Fed Cir 1986). The problem of unauthorized use addressed in the
text arises only when the research user bypasses the patent holder entirely in making or
using the invention.
71 See note 74 and accompanying text.
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a researcher who is using a patented invention to develop alterna-
tive means of solving the same problem.79 A research exemption in
this context would not only deprive the patent holder of the royal-
ties that this particular user might otherwise pay, but also threat-
ens ultimately to cut short the effective duration of the patent
holder's monopoly if the user succeeds in developing a competing
technology that can be used without infringing the patent claims.
Such research is plainly hostile to the financial interests of the pat-
ent holder and reduces the expected profitability of the patent,
suggesting that an exemption from infringement liability in this
context would reduce patent incentives.
One might object that the patent laws should not protect pat-
ent owners from the "loss of emoluments" arising from technologi-
cal obsolescence of the patented invention. Otherwise, the patent
laws would give the patent holder a financial incentive to block the
development of new technologies. Thus, an exemption from in-
fringement liability may be necessary in order to be sure that tech-
nological progress occurs. Such an exemption is consistent with the
intuition of some courts that "inventing around" patents is socially
beneficial.8s
But the rationale for such an exemption is in tension with the
incentives justification for patents. Permitting the unlicensed use
of patented inventions for the purpose of inventing around patents
would appear to reduce the value of patents by shortening the
term of effective commercial monopoly, thereby reducing incen-
tives to make patentable inventions in the first place.
Even when research users are neither potential customers nor
potential competitors of the patent holder, the incentives justifica-
tion for patents does not supply an argument for a research ex-
emption. At most, it suggests that such an exemption will be harm-
less so long as it does not affect the overall profitability of the
patent.
C. Incentive to Innovate and the Prospect Theory
Although the courts have relied primarily on the incentive to
invent and incentive to disclose arguments in support of the patent
system,81 commentators have offered the additional argument that
7 See text accompanying note 222.
80 See note 44.
81 A rare possible exception is the concurring opinion of Judge Frank in Picard v
United Aircraft Corp., 128 F2d 632 (2d Cir 1942), in which he states: "The controversy
between the defenders and assailants of our patent system may be about a false issue-the
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a patent monopoly is necessary to induce firms to invest in "inno-
vation"-i.e., putting existing inventions to practical use.82 Even
after an invention has been made, considerable further investment
is often necessary before it is ready for commercial exploitation.
Further research and development may be needed to establish the
commercial feasibility of the invention and to bring it into large
scale production. Use of the invention may call for the construc-
tion of new plant and equipment. A new product invention may
require further refinements to suit the tastes of consumers, as well
as promotion and advertising expenditures to persuade consumers
to buy it. These additional investments may dwarf the initial re-
search expenditures in making the invention."3 The protection of a
patent monopoly enhances the likelihood that a firm will be willing
to undertake these investments.
Like the incentive to invent and incentive to disclose theories,
the incentive to innovate theory holds that the patent system
achieves its objectives by offering monopoly profits as a lure to
promote desired behavior. But it differs from these other theories
with respect to the time frame in which the incentive matters. The
incentive to invent and incentive to disclose theories are concerned
with incentives that operate before a patent issues. These theories
assume that the patent monopoly has already served its social
function of promoting invention and disclosure as soon as the pat-
ent issues, and that enforcement of the patent thereafter is simply
the regrettable price that society must pay in order to live up to its
end of the bargain.8 4 Reducing the strength of existing patents
stimulus to invention. The real issue may be the stimulus to investment." Id at 643. This
statement suggests a view of the patent system as promoting innovation as well as inven-
tion. See also SCM v Xerox, 645 F2d 1195, 1206 n 9 (2d Cir 1981).
s2 See, for example, Scherer, Industrial Market Structure at 381 (cited in note 30);
Scherer, Invention and Innovation in the Watt-Boulton Steam Engine Venture, 6 Tech &
Culture 165 (1965); Machlup, Subcomm on Patents, Study No 15 at 36-38, 56 (cited in note
30); Stedman, 12 J L & Contemp Probs at 653 (cited in note 44).
s3 Edwin Mansfield, et al, The Production and Application of New Industrial Technol-
ogy (Norton, 1977); Scherer, Industrial Market Structure at 381 (cited in note 30) (noting
that development outlays constitute more than three fourths of all industrial R&D expendi-
tures); John Jewkes, David Sawers, and Richard Stillerman, The Sources of Invention 212-
17 (MacMillan, 2d ed 1969). See also Frederic M. Scherer, Innovation and Growth:
Schumpeterian Perspectives 3-7 (MIT, 1984) (explaining that firms are more willing to in-
vest large sums in development than in invention because of the unpredictability of initial
technical breakthroughs).
" As Machlup explains:
If one accepts the theory that patent protection has the social function of serving as an
incentive for inventive activity, one accepts, by implication, that the beneficial effects
of this incentive system must flow, not from existing patents, but from the hope for
future profits from future patents; this hope may induce people to undertake certain
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would thus presumably offer short run social benefits by increasing
the use of already patented inventions, although in the long run it
would reduce incentives to make and disclose new inventions. By
contrast, the incentive to innovate theory gives existing patents an
ongoing role in preserving the incentives of patent holders to in-
vest in development during the patent term. Reducing the strength
of existing patent monopolies might thus have the effect of under-
mining incentives to put existing technologies into use.8 5
1. The Schumpeterian Theory.
The thesis that monopolies are conducive to innovation is gen-
erally associated with the work of Joseph Schumpeter on economic
development. 6 While Schumpeter does not focus exclusively on ei-
ther technological innovations or the patent system, his analysis
suggests how patent monopolies might promote technological inno-
vation.2 He emphatically distinguishes innovation from invention,
noting that invention itself produces "no economically relevant ef-
fect at all.""8 Innovation, on the other hand, brings about incessant
risky investments and useful activities-to wit, financing and arranging industrial re-
search-which they might not undertake otherwise. ... [E]xisting patents impose a
burden on society, a burden which it has decided to carry in order to hold out to people
the chance of obtaining future profits from future patents on future inventions.
Machlup, Subcomm on Patents, Study No 15 at 55 (cited in note 30).
85 While Machiup notes the emergence of "incentive to innovate" arguments and ac-
knowledges that existing patents would play an ongoing role in stimulating post-patent in-
novation as opposed to pre-patent invention, he does not analyze these arguments beyond
stating that they require demonstrating "that innovations based on patentable inventions
are socially more desirable than other innovations, and that the free-enterprise system
would not, without monopoly incentives, generate investment opportunities to an adequate
extent." Id at 56. He also suggests, without elaboration, that the use of patents to promote
innovation rather than invention might not be properly subsumed in the Constitutional goal
of promoting "the Progress of Science and useful Arts." Id.
"' Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy 81-110 (Harper & Row,
3d ed 1950); Joseph Schumpeter, 1 Business Cycles 84-192 (McGraw Hill, 1939); Joseph
Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development 61-94 (Transaction reprint, Redvers
Opie trans 1983). See also, generally, Scherer, Schumpeterian Perspectives, (cited in note
83); Morton I. Kamien and Nancy L. Schwartz, Market Structure and Innovation (Cam-
bridge, 1982); Vernon W. Ruttan, Usher and Schumpeter on Invention, Innovation, and
Technological Change, 73 Q J Econ 596 (1959); Carolyn S. Solo, Innovation in the Capital-
ist Process: A Critique of the Schumpeterian Theory, 65 Q J Econ 417 (1951).
87 Schumpeter defines innovation broadly to include not only putting new technological
inventions into practice, but also carrying out any new combination of productive resources
that amounts to "the setting up of a new production function." Schumpeter, 1 Business
Cycles at 87 (cited in note 86). In Schumpeter's usage the term innovation includes the
development of new consumer goods, new methods of production, new markets, and new
forms of industrial organization. Id at 84; Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism & Democracy
at 82-83 (cited in note 86).
" Schumpeter, 1 Business Cycles at 84 (cited in note 86). See also Schumpeter, The
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revolutionary changes in the economic system through what
Schumpeter calls "a process of creative destruction."8'9 In this pro-
cess, new firms continually arise to carry out new innovations, driv-
ing out old firms that provide obsolete goods and services. Compe-
tition from new commodities and new technologies is far more
significant in this model than price competition among firms offer-
ing similar goods and services.90
Schumpeter argues that in a dynamic model of the capitalist
system, monopoly conditions may promote innovation and growth
more effectively than competition. 1 He bases this view primarily
on "the tritest common sense,"92 although he also notes as a mat-
ter of casual observation that economic advances are more fre-
quently traced to big business than to firms in atomistically com-
petitive industries.9 He reasons that in the rapidly changing
conditions of a capitalist economy, investment in innovation re-
quires some sort of hedge against losses.94 Protection from compe-
tition also allows firms "to gain the time and space for further de-
velopments."95 Finally, and perhaps most important, the prospect
of earning more than an ordinary return permits innovators to se-
cure the financial backing of capitalists and to bid productive re-
sources away from their current uses.9 A monopoly position se-
cured through patent protection thus may increase rather than
restrict the use of known technologies by facilitating the commer-
Theory of Economic Development at 88-89 (cited in note 86) ("As long as they are not
carried into practice, inventions are economically irrelevant. And to carry any improvement
into effect is a task entirely different from the inventing of it.").
" Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism & Democracy at 83 (cited in note 86).
90 Id at 84. Competition arising from innovation "strikes not at the margins of the prof-
its and the outputs of the existing firms but at their foundations and their very lives." Id.
91 Id at 87-106.
92 Id at 91.
Is Id at 82. For other perspectives, see generally Arrow, Economic Welfare (cited in
note 30) (arguing that incentive to innovate should be greater for competitive firms than for
monopolists); Henry Villard, Competition, Oligopoly and Research, 66 J Pol Econ 483
(1958) (arguing that "competitive oligopoly," characterized by a small number of big firms,
promotes research better than either pure competition or monopoly).
Subsequent empirical studies to test Schumpeter's impression that monopoly condi-
tions are more conducive to innovation than competition have been inconclusive. Scherer,
Schumpeterian Perspectives at 169-255 and sources cited therein (cited in note 83); Kamien
and Schwartz, Market Structure at 49-104 and sources cited therein (cited in note 86);
Scherer, Industrial Market Structure at 363-64 and sources cited therein (cited in note 30).
"Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism & Democracy at 88 (cited in note 86) (arguing
that monopoly profits may represent in part a charge to consumers for the imputed cost of
self-insurance against future losses).
- Id at 89.
" Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development at 67-74 (cited in note 86).
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cial introduction of such technologies by innovating firms.
The Schumpeterian theory, while supplying a basis for believ-
ing that patents serve some ongoing function even after inventions
have been made, nonetheless offers little guidance in assessing the
proper role of patents in subsequent research. To the extent that
an experimental use exemption facilitates the development of al-
ternative technologies to compete with a patented invention, it
would shorten the expected duration of the patent holder's effec-
tive monopoly, thereby reducing incentives to invest in the com-
mercial development of the existing patented invention. Moreover,
the loss of royalties that might otherwise be collectible from re-
searchers would reduce the value of patent monopolies, thereby
weakening incentives to innovate. But in the absence of some way
of measuring the magnitude of these effects, the Schumpeterian
perspective soon leads to the same analytical dead end as the in-
centive to invent and incentive to disclose theories: its policy im-
plications turn on empirical questions without clear answers.
2. The Prospect Theory.
Edmund Kitch offers a more elaborate analysis of the role of
patents in post-invention innovation in what he calls the "prospect
theory" of patent protection. 7 According to this theory, the patent
system promotes efficiency in the allocation of resources to the de-
velopment of existing inventions by awarding exclusive, publicly
recorded ownership in new technological "prospects" shortly after
their discovery. 8 The term "prospect theory" highlights an anal-
ogy between the functions of patent monopolies and awards of ex-
clusive mineral claims in government owned lands in the American
West.9
The prospect theory offers a justification for patents that is in
keeping with broader theories of property rights elaborated by
Harold Demsetz 00 and Richard Posner.101 These commentators ar-
97 Kitch, 20 J L & Econ at 267-71 (cited in note 54).
98 Id at 268.
" The analogy between patents and mineral claims was foreshadowed by George Frost
in a footnote in a 1946 article. George Frost, Legal Incidents of Non-Use of Patented In-
ventions Reconsidered, 14 Geo Wash L Rev 273, 279 n 24 (1946) ("An interesting analogy
may be drawn between the law relating to patents for inventions and the mining law, an
analogy which emphasizes the fact that patents are only one of the many situations where
an exclusive grant is provided to encourage effort and capital investment.").
100 Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am Econ Rev 347 (1967)
(Am Econ Assoc Papers & Proceedings).
101 Posner, Economic Analysis of the Law at 27-31 (cited in note 40).
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gue that private property rights promote greater efficiency in the
use of resources than communal ownership because individuals can
be expected to exploit communally owned resources too quickly in
order to appropriate the resources for themselves before other
community members deplete them. The result will be an exhaus-
tion of resources by individuals in the present, with the costs to be
borne by the community as a whole in the future. Private owner-
ship avoids this problem by placing property owners in a position
to realize the full costs as well as the benefits of exploitation,
thereby internalizing what would be external costs in a system of
communal ownership.
The analogy between patents and other types of property0 2 is
not immediately apparent because inventions that can be used to
an unlimited extent without exhaustion do not seem to present the
same problems of scarcity and depletion as tangible resources.
Kitch clarifies the analogy by noting that while information may
be used without exhausting it, resources available to use informa-
tion are scarce, and property rights in inventions can improve the
efficiency with which these resources are managed.010
Kitch contends that patents promote efficiency in the use of
resources to develop patented inventions in part by putting patent
owners in a position to coordinate subsequent research and devel-
opment efforts. 04 Since the owner of a patent has the exclusive
right to exploit the technology defined in the patent claims, no one
else is likely to invest in developing this technology without first
making arrangements with the patent owner; otherwise, the subse-
quent researchers might ultimately be unable to benefit from their
own investment in development for lack of a license to the under-
lying patented technology. The patent owner is thus in a position
101 While judicial decisions often speak of patent rights as a species of "property,"
economists studying the patent system for the most part have not drawn on property rights
theory. Indeed, Fritz Machlup argues that the characterization of patents as creating "prop-
erty rights" in inventions reflects confusion as to the difference between "property" and
"monopoly." Machlup, Subcomm on Patents, Study No 15 at 53-54 (cited in note 30).
Machiup and Penrose trace this confusion to a deliberate "political ruse" advanced by nine-
teenth century advocates of the patent system in order to claim for their cause the respecta-
ble connotations of the word "property" in place of the less favorable connotations of the
word "privilege." Machlup and Penrose, 10 J Econ Hist at 16-17 (cited in note 27).
103 Kitch, 20 J L & Econ at 275-76 (cited in note 54).
I" Id at 276. Kitch also asserts that patents promote efficiency in the development of
technological prospects by preserving the incentives of patent holders to develop their in-
ventions without fear that the results of these efforts will be appropriated by competitors
and by allowing patent holders to disclose their technological achievements to other firms
without losing their exclusive rights, thereby facilitating the transfer of technology among
firms and reducing the amount of duplicative research efforts. Id at 276-79.
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to cause researchers to share information and thereby avoid dupli-
cative research efforts. In the absence of a patent, different investi-
gators might try independently to develop the same invention in
secrecy, each working without the benefit of the knowledge gained
through the efforts of the others. Exclusive rights in technological
prospects thus promote efficiency in research after the patent is-
sues by putting the patent holder in a position to monitor and con-
trol such research.
Kitch finds support for the thesis that patent rights play a sig-
nificant role in the ongoing development of patented inventions in
two features of the patent system.10 5 First, the patent statute au-
thorizes and promotes patent protection at an early stage in the
development of new inventions, 10° making it likely that further re-
search will remain to be done in order to develop an invention dur-
ing the term of the patent.10 7 According to Kitch, inventions are
commonly patented long before it becomes commercially feasible
to exploit them. 08 The inventor who delays filing a patent applica-
tion while continuing to develop the invention may lose the right
to patent protection entirely if in the interim the inventor makes a
public use of the invention' 09 or begins to exploit it commercially
in secrecy;1 0 if the invention is described in the literature or used
100 These features are analyzed at length in id at 267-71, and only briefly reviewed in
text herein.
106 In order to obtain a patent, an applicant need only show that the invention
works-i.e., that it is capable of performing some useful function. The applicant need not
show that the invention works better than other means of accomplishing the same purpose,
nor even that it works well. All that is necessary is a written disclosure of the invention
sufficient to enable someone skilled in the field to reduce the invention to practice-i.e., to
make and use it. 35 USC §§ 102(g), 112 (1982). The applicant does not have to describe
every possible embodiment of the invention, although § 112 does require disclosure of the
"best mode" of practicing the invention known to the inventor at the time the patent appli-
cation is filed.
107 Kitch, 20 J L & Econ at 269-71 (cited in note 54).
108 Empirical evidence contradicts Kitch on this point. Barkev Sanders, in a study of
assigned patents issued in 1938, 1948, and 1952, found that of the estimated 10 percent of
patented inventions ever put to commercial use, about 40 percent were first put to use
before the patent application was filed, about 50 percent were first put to use while the
application was pending, and only about 10 percent were first put to use after issuance of
the patent. Barkev Sanders, Speedy Entry of Patented Inventions into Commercial Use, 6
Pat, Trademark & Copyright J of Research & Educ 87 (1962). See also Scherer, Compulsory
Licensing at 9-10 and sources cited therein (cited in note 61) (indicating that the making of
a patentable invention accompanies or follows commercial development more frequently
than it precedes a lengthy period of subsequent development).
106 35 USC § 102(b) (1982); Egbert v Lippmann, 104 US 333 (1881).
110 See generally Pennock v Dialogue, 27 US (2 Pet) 1 (1829); Metallizing Engineering
Co. v Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F2d 516 (2d Cir 1946).
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by others;"' if intervening progress in the field makes the inven-
tion obvious;' or if a competitor files an earlier patent application
on the same invention.113
Second, Kitch asserts that the patent monopoly is generally
not limited to the primitive version of the invention described in
the patent application, but extends to subsequent refinements as
well.114 Subsequent improved versions of the invention falling
within the scope of the patent claims and newly discovered uses for
the invention, although the product of further research by others,
will still be subject to the control of the patent holder until the
patent expires. 1 5 The patent holder will therefore stand to benefit
from subsequent research to improve the invention, while other re-
searchers will have little incentive to pursue further research on a
patented invention without first arranging for a license to the un-
derlying patent."' Kitch argues that taken together, these features
of the patent system tend to promote control over subsequent re-
search on patented inventions by patent holders and their licen-
sees, and that such control promotes efficiency.
The prospect theory finds no direct support in the language of
judicial decisions and has been criticized by economists.1 None-
theless, those who believe that the prospect theory identifies an
important function of the patent system might argue that patent
21 35 USC § 102(b) (1982).
112 35 USC § 103 (1982).
113 Although in the U.S. patent system patent priority is awarded to the first inventor
rather than to the first to file a patent application, the date of the patent application is
presumed to be the same as the applicant's date of invention unless the inventor is able to
prove an earlier invention date. See 35 USC § 102(g) (1982); Lacotte v Thomas, 758 F2d 611
(Fed Cir 1985).
114 Kitch, 20 J L & Econ at 268-69 (cited in note 54). As an empirical matter, this
assertion is also subject to doubt. The scope of patent claims will often have to be quite
narrow in order to distinguish the patented invention from the prior art. See generally Rob-
ert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on Inno-
vation, 76 Cal L Rev 803, 840-41 (1988) and sources cited therein.
11 The subsequent inventor might be entitled to a patent on her improvement or new
use of the earlier invention, but would not be able to exploit this patent without the permis-
sion of the holder of the patent on the underlying invention. The patent on the improve-
ment or new use would enable the subsequent inventor to prevent the underlying patent
holder from using this later invention. Thus no one could use the improvement without the
permission of both patent holders. See, for example, Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. v DeForest
Radio Tel. & Tel. Co., 236 F 942 (S D NY 1916), aff'd, 243 F 560 (2d Cir 1917).
"I See note 43 and accompanying text.
"1 See, for example, Frederic M. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic
Performance 447 n 30 (Rand McNally, 2d ed 1980) (stating that Kitch's views seem "little
influenced by any concern for reality"); Roger L. Beck, The Prospect Theory of the Patent
System and Unproductive Competition, 5 Res L & Econ 193 (1983) (noting that contrary to
Kitch's assumptions, patents do not protect future developments).
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holders should be able to use their exclusive rights to control the
use of their inventions in subsequent research. An exemption from
infringement liability for those who use patented inventions in re-
search could interfere with the prospect function by preventing
patent holders from monitoring and coordinating subsequent re-
search efforts within the patent prospect. Subsequent researchers
who do not need the patent holder's permission to proceed with
their research might work in secrecy, duplicating each other's ef-
forts without knowing what their predecessors have already
learned.
In some situations, patent holders may not need a legal right
to stop others from doing research to improve their inventions in
order for patents to perform the prospect function. So long as pat-
ent holders can prevent the ultimate commercial exploitation of
improved versions of their inventions, one might expect that unli-
censed researchers would have little incentive to undertake im-
provement efforts without first entering into agreements with pat-
ent holders even if they did not yet need a license at the research
stage. Without such agreements, they might find at the end of
their research that they were unable to exploit the results of their
own efforts because the patent holder was unwilling to grant them
a license to use the underlying invention." 8
Some subsequent researchers might find it worthwhile to im-
prove a patented invention even without a license if the improve-
ment itself were patentable. The inventor of the improvement
could sell licenses to use the improvement to the holder of the pat-
ent on the underlying invention and her licensees. Moreover, hold-
ing exclusive rights in the improvement might enhance the bar-
gaining position of the subsequent inventor in negotiating for a
license to the underlying invention. Thus, while the right to pre-
vent ultimate commercial exploitation of an invention might some-
times be enough to put patent holders in a position to coordinate
subsequent research efforts to improve their inventions, it seems
likely that in some cases unauthorized (and uncoordinated) re-
search will proceed unless patent holders have the right to enjoin
the use of their inventions in research. In such cases an experimen-
tal use exemption arguably undermines the prospect function, thus
interfering with the efficient development of a patent prospect.
"' See text following note 104.
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C. Summary
Although judicial decisions have long recognized that the use
of patented inventions in research should be exempt from infringe-
ment liability, theoretical justifications for the patent laws offered
by the courts and commentators do not supply a clear rationale for
such an exemption. The courts generally justify the award of pat-
ents as providing an incentive to make and disclose new inven-
tions. This justification says nothing about what level of incentives
is optimal for achieving these goals, nor does it afford a basis for
excluding research users from the categories of users who must pay
patent holders for access to their inventions. Nonetheless, it lends
a superficial coherence to the suggestion of some courts that re-
search uses of patented inventions can safely be exempted from
liability because they cause no harm or loss of profits to the patent
owner." 9 If one assumes that the level of patent incentives pro-
vided by an unqualified seventeen year monopoly, without an ex-
perimental use exemption, is either optimal or too low, then it ar-
guably follows that any such exemption should only apply to
research uses that have no impact on this level of incentives. This
reasoning would seem to argue against an experimental use exemp-
tion for research users who are either potential customers or poten-
tial competitors of the patent holder.
The work of several commentators, most notably Joseph
Schumpeter, suggests that patent monopolies might promote tech-
nological innovation-the practical development of existing inven-
tions. Unfortunately, like the incentive to invent and incentive to
disclose theories, the policy implications of the incentive to inno-
vate theory turn on empirical questions without clear answers.
The prospect theory seems to argue against an experimental
use exemption for subsequent research in the field of the patented
invention. This theory focuses on efficiency in subsequent research
rather than on promoting research before the patent issues, hold-
ing that patents promote efficiency by permitting patent owners to
monitor and control subsequent research within the scope of a pat-
ented technological prospect. It is not clear in all cases that a pat-
ent must confer the right to exclude researchers from using the
invention in order to achieve these efficiency benefits. Nonetheless,
"' The coherence is superficial because the no-harm analysis fails to address the ques-
tion of whether, in the absence of an exemption, the research user might have paid a royalty
to the patent owner. Moreover, the analysis ignores the possibility that subsequent research
users of a patented invention will destroy the value of the patent monopoly by developing
alternative technologies. See text at notes 71-80.
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it seems likely that at least in some cases an exemption from in-
fringement liability for research users of patented inventions could
operate at cross purposes with the prospect function by permitting
wasteful duplicative research.
With this background, we can now consider countervailing ar-
guments in favor of free access to prior discoveries as a means of
promoting scientific progress emerging from the sociology, history,
and philosophy of science literature.
II. THE CASE FOR FREE ACCESS TO SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERIES
A. Communal Ownership of Discoveries as a Scientific Ideal
The idea of enforcing of exclusive rights in new discoveries
against researchers fundamentally conflicts with traditional scien-
tific norms calling for free dedication of new knowledge to the sci-
entific community.120 Robert Merton describes this scientific norm
of "communism" as follows:
The substantive findings of science are a product of social col-
laboration and are assigned to the community. They consti-
tute a common heritage in which the equity of the individual
producer is severely limited .... The scientist's claim to "his"
intellectual "property" is limited to that of recognition and
esteem .... 12
Merton explains the norm of communism primarily in functional
terms, arguing that it derives from the scientific community's insti-
120 See Merton, Normative Structure at 270 (cited in note 2); Barber, Science and the
Social Order at 90-93 (cited in note 2); Storer, Social System of Science at 79 (cited in note
3); Hagstrom, The Scientific Community at 12-23 (cited in note 3).
" Merton, Normative Structure at 273 (cited in note 2). Merton identifies "commu-
nism" as one of four interrelated norms of science, the others being universalism, disinter-
estedness, and organized skepticism. "Universalism" means that the veracity of claimed ob-
servations is to be determined on the basis of impersonal criteria without regard to the
identity of the scientist who makes the observation. Id at 270-73. "Disinterestedness" means
that scientists should seek new knowledge for its own sake rather than seeking to further
their own interests. Id at 275-77. "Organized skepticism" means that the scientific commu-
nity should subject the claims and beliefs of its members to empirical scrutiny before ac-
cepting them as true. Id at 277-78.
According to Merton, scientists violate the norm of communism whenever they restrict
access to their discoveries-even if they do so for the sole purpose of compelling "payment"
in the form of proper acknowledgement of their contributions:
Once he has made his contribution, the scientist no longer has exclusive rights of access
to it. It becomes part of the public domain of science. Nor has he the right of regulat-
ing its use by others by withholding it unless it is acknowledged as his.
Robert K. Merton, Priorities in Scientific Discovery, in Merton, The Sociology of Science
at 286, 294 (cited in note 2).
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tutional goal of "the extension of certified knowledge."1 2 The re-
ward system of science reinforces this norm by impelling scientists
to contribute new knowledge to the community in order to earn
recognition for priority of discovery.2
Bernard Barber identifies the same value, under the less polit-
ically charged label of "communality," as one of the "ideals of the
social organization of science."' 2 For Barber, the ideal of commu-
nality has both a moral dimension and a functional dimension. In
moral terms, it calls upon scientists who have benefitted in their
research from access to prior discoveries of others to repay the
debt by contributing their own discoveries to the scientific commu-
nity as a whole.' 25 In functional terms, it ensures that all scientists
will have access to the ideas, materials, and collegial interaction
necessary to proceed with their own work.2
Both Merton and Barber remark upon the contrast between
the communal character of ownership in new scientific discoveries
and the exclusivity of private property rights in a capitalist econ-
omy. 127 At a functional level, the contradiction between scientific
communism/communality and the grant of exclusive rights in new
discoveries under the patent system reflects divergent perspectives
on how best to promote scientific progress. The patent laws rest on
the premise that granting exclusive rights in discoveries will pro-
122 Merton, Normative Structure at 270 (cited in note 2). Merton also identifies a moral
dimension to the norms of science, noting that although they derive from functional consid-
erations they are binding on scientists in part "because they are believed right and good."
Id.
123 Id at 273.
114 Barber, Science and the Social Order at 90-91 (cited in note 2). Barber's scientific
"ideals" parallel Merton's scientific norms (see note 121) with the substitution of "individu-
alism" for "organized skepticism" (Barber, Science and the Social Order at 65 (cited in note
2)), and the addition of "rationality" and "emotional neutrality." Id at 86-89.
125 Id at 91 ("The man who takes from science according to his needs has the moral
obligation to publish any new discoveries he builds upon the goods that the community has
lent him.").
126 Id. ("Secrecy... deprives [scientists] of the necessary materials of their own work.
It also eliminates what we shall see is essential to all scientific innovation, namely, the infor-
mal discussion among scientists of new work and new ideas.").
117 Barber notes that in its ideal of communality the scientific community departs from
the dominant moral values of a liberal society- "Where liberal society as a whole values
private property rights in scarce goods, in science such rights are reduced to the absolute
minimum of credit for priority of discovery." Id.
Merton sees the scientific norm of communism as "incompatible with the definition of
technology as 'private property' in a capitalistic economy," noting that the inconsistency
arises from "discrepancies in the conception of intellectual property." Merton, Normative
Structure at 275 (cited in note 2). In other words, the scientist's "intellectual property" is
not a right to exclude others from using the invention, but merely a right to acknowledge-
ment and recognition for dedicating a new discovery to the community.
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mote progress; the normative authority of scientific communism/
communality derives at least in part from the assumption that this
same goal will be better served by granting free access to such
discoveries.12
B. Functions of Free Access to Discoveries
Sociologists of science often take it for granted that free access
to prior discoveries promotes scientific progress without bothering
to explain why this is so. Many commentators have observed that
scientists often depart from communitarian ideals in practice," 9
but for the most part they have not challenged the social desirabil-
ity of compliance with these ideals as a means of advancing sci-
ence.130 Although most writers have not directly addressed the
question of how free access to prior discoveries facilitates scientific
progress, the literature in the sociology, history, and philosophy of
science nonetheless sheds some light on this question.
1. Scrutiny of research claims.
One benefit of free access to scientific discoveries that features
prominently in functionalist accounts of scientific norms is that ac-
cess permits other scientists to scrutinize the claims of prior re-
searchers. This provides a mechanism for decentralized social con-
trol within the scientific community.13 1
128 See, for example, Barber, Science and the Social Order at 152 (cited in note 2)
(asserting that university scientists oppose patenting their discoveries because scientific
communality "is functionally necessary... for otherwise parts of scientific theory would be
removed from the public domain and thereby the advancement of science would be hin-
dered."); see Storer, Social System'of Science at 83-101 (cited in note 3) (arguing that scien-
tists subscribe to the Mertonian norms of science primarily because of their importance for
the continued and just allocation of "competent response" by professional colleagues to the
contributions of individual scientists).
"9 See, for example, William Broad and Nicholas Wade, Betrayers of the Truth 78-79
(Simon & Schuster, 1982); Ravetz, Scientific Knowledge and its Social Problems at 311-12
(cited in note 2); Theodore D. Sterling, Analysis and Reanalysis of Shared Scientific Data,
495 Annals of Am Acad Pd Soc Sci 49, 56-59 (1988) and sources cited therein; Michael
Mulkay, Sociology of Science in the West, 28 Current Soc 1, 43-64 (1980) and sources cited
therein; Nico Stehr, The Ethos of Science Revisited, in Jerry Gaston, ed, The Sociology of
Science 172 (Jossey-Bass, 1978) and sources cited therein; Harriet Zuckerman, Deviant Be-
havior and Social Control in Science, in Edward Sagarin, ed, Deviance and Social Change
87, 102-04 (Sage, 1977). See also Eisenberg, 97 Yale L J at 182-83 n 17, 197-205 (cited in
note 3).
130 But also see Ian I. Mitroff, The Subjective Side of Science 73-79 (Elsevier, 1974);
Ian I. Mitroff, Norms and Counter-Norms in a Select Group of the Apollo Moon Scientists:
A Case Study of the Ambivalence of Scientists, 39 Am Soc Rev 579, 593-94 (1974) (dis-
cussed in notes 200-202 and accompanying text).
131 See, for example, Merton, Normative Structure at 276 (cited in note 2); Storer, So-
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Although free access to prior research results theoretically per-
mits attempts at replication and thus supplies a safeguard against
fraud, error, or self-deception in the presentation of research
claims, the effectiveness of this system of social control is open to
question. Merton, writing in 1942, proclaimed the "virtual absence
of fraud in the annals of science," attributing this remarkable rec-
ord to "rigorous policing" ensured by "the public and testable
character of science."1 ' More recent commentators have chal-
lenged the accuracy of Merton's claims in light of increasing re-
ports of fraud in science, 133 suggesting that there are significant
limits to the mechanisms of the scientific community for ensuring
effective scrutiny of research results.
One obvious limit arises from departures by scientists from
the idealized communitarian norms described by Merton and Bar-
ber. The scientific community cannot scrutinize claimed discover-
ies that are not made available for replication. In practice, scien-
tists often fail to publish their research results in replicable form
and refuse to share their data or essential research materials with
interested investigators even after publication.13 4 Even when re-
sults are published in replicable form or otherwise made subject to
cial System of Science at 82-83 (cited in note 3); Hagstrom, The Scientific Community at 9-
56 (cited in note 3); Zuckerman, in Deviance and Social Change at 90-98 (cited in note 129).
132 Merton, Normative Structure at 276 (cited in note 2).
,3 See, for example, Fraud in Biomedical Research: Hearings Before the Subcomm on
Investigations and Oversight of the House Comm on Science and Technology, 97th Cong,
1st Sess (1981); AAAS-ABA National Conference of Lawyers and Scientists, Project on Sci-
entific Fraud and Misconduct: Report on Workshop Number One (1988); Broad and Wade,
Betrayers of the Truth (cited in note 129); Deena Weinstein, Fraud in Science, 59 Soc Sci Q
639 (1979).
13 See Broad and Wade, Betrayers of Truth at 76, 78-79 (cited in note 129); Sterling,
495 Annals at 56-59 (cited in note 129); Eisenberg, 97 Yale L J at 204 (cited in note 3);
Stephen J. Ceci and Elaine Walker, Private Archives and Public Needs, 38 Am Psychologist
414, 415-18 (1983).
The reasons for these departures from communitarian norms are not difficult to
surmise. Scrutiny of one's research claims could potentially result in the disclosure of bias,
carelessness, or even outright fraud. Storer, Social System of Science at 128-29 (cited in
note 3); Sterling, 495 Annals at 59 (cited in note 129). Or, the scrutinizer may simply disa-
gree with the prior researcher's interpretation of data, leading to conflict and potential loss
of esteem in the scientific community. Id at 58-59. For a recent example of a dispute over
the interpretation of data leading to conflict and controversy in the scientific community,
see Barbara J. Culliton, A Bitter Battle Over Error, 240 Science 1720 (1988); Barbara J.
Culliton, A Bitter Battle Over Error (II), 241 Science 18 (1988); Philip M. Boffey, Nobel
Winner Is Caught Up in a Dispute over Study, NY Times C1 (April 12, 1988). Moreover,
sharing one's research discoveries could allow competitors to gain an advantage in subse-
quent research, diluting opportunities to earn additional recognition for future discoveries
emanating from the earlier results. Storer, Social System of Science at 129-31 (cited in note
3); Sterling, 495 Annals at 57-58 (cited in note 129); Eisenberg, 97 Yale L J at 204-07 (cited
in note 3).
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135
effective scrutiny, actual efforts at replication are rare. The high
degree of specialization in some research fields reduces the number
of investigators capable of replicating any given piece of re-
search.13 6 Even among specialists, the degree of reproducibility of
research results varies from one discipline to the next, depending
on such factors as the precision of measurements attainable in the
present state of knowledge in the discipline and whether data is
gathered through observation of a complex and changing field or
through experimentation under controlled conditions. 3 7
Beyond these problems of feasibility is a problem of motiva-
tion. Replication consumes time and resources and is rarely worth
the effort.138 It is difficult to obtain funding or to earn recognition
in the scientific community for experiments aimed at replicating
someone else's work, and such experiments are unlikely to lead to
publication whatever their outcome.' Scientific rewards accrue to
those who publish original research, not to those who merely re-
peat what somebody else has already done. 140
Another reason why scientists might fail to check the prior re-
search results of their colleagues through replication is that they
may be predisposed to accept without challenge research results
that confirm prevailing theories. The expectation that scientists
will attempt to replicate each other's published research results as-
sumes that scientists adopt a skeptical attitude toward received
wisdom and that the scientific enterprise subjects hypotheses to
1"' Broad and Wade, Betrayers of the Truth at 76-77 (cited in note 129); see generally
Zuckerman, in Deviance and Social Change at 94 (cited in note 129) (asserting that the
extent of actual replication varies from one scientific field to the next).
136 Id at 94.
137 Storer, Social System of Science at 117-18 (cited in note 3); Zuckerman, in Devi-
ance and Social Change at 93 (cited in note 129).
118 Broad and Wade, Betrayers of the Truth at 76 (cited in note 129). Repeating an
experiment that was done in another laboratory may require obtaining equipment and
materials and mastering new techniques. Scientists generally do not have the time and re-
sources to replicate even all of the prior work on which their own current research depends.
Weinstein, 59 Soc Sci Q at 648 (cited in note 133).
131 See id at 646 (reporting private correspondence from an anonymous researcher who
indicated that a journal that had published an original study was unwilling to consider the
researcher's refutation of the study for publication, and that another journal agreed to pub-
lish the refutation only after it was revised to delete any questions raised about the integrity
of the original researcher's findings); See also Theodore D. Sterling, Publication Decisions
and Their Possible Effects on Inferences Drawn from Tests of Significance or Vice Versa,
54 J Am Stat Assoc 30 (1959) (reporting that not one paper published in three major psy-
chology journals in 1955 and in another in 1956 replicated previous work).
14 Hagstrom, The Scientific Community at 69 (cited in note 3); Patricia K. Woolf,
Deception in Scientific Research, in AAAS-ABA National Conference of Lawyers and
Scientists at 37, 61 (cited in note 133).
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rigorous testing. As Merton explains:
The organization of science operates as a system of institu-
tionalized vigilance, involving competitive cooperation. It af-
fords both commitment and reward for finding where others
have erred or have stopped before tracking down the implica-
tions of their results or have passed over in their work what is
there to be seen by the fresh eye of another. In such a system,
scientists are at the ready to pick apart and appraise each new
claim to knowledge.141
This sociologist's conception of an eternally vigilant scientific com-
munity is consistent with the image of science underlying the phil-
osophical tradition of logical empiricism. For example, Karl Pop-
per argues that the criterion of demarcation that distinguishes
science from nonscience is that scientific theories are subject to
"falsification" by comparing theory-based predictions with the re-
sults of empirical tests.14U According to Popper, science advances
through ever more rigorous efforts of scientists to prove prevailing
theories wrong.14 3
Thomas Kuhn challenges this view of science, arguing that
scientists generally aim to confirm prevailing theories rather than
to falsify them.144 According to Kuhn, fields of research develop in
stages marked by the influence of distinct "paradigms," or exem-
plary solutions to specific research problems, that serve as models
for researchers working in the field. 45 Such paradigms, and the un-
141 Robert K. Merton, Behavior Patterns of Scientists, in Merton, ed, The Sociology of
Science at 325, 339 (cited in note 2).
14 Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery 34-42 (Hutchinson, English ed 1959).
Popper explains that a scientific theory can never be verified, since subsequent observations
might always prove it wrong. At best, a theory may be corroborated for the time being by
experiments that yield results consistent with its predictions. Id at 32-34, 251-81. Thus,
scientific research never leads to the discovery of general statements of regularities that may
be accepted as "true." Id at 44-48.
11 Id at 278-81.
1" See Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago, 2d ed 1970).
For a comparison of the views of Kuhn and Popper, see Thomas Kuhn, Logic of Discovery
or Psychology of Research?, in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds, Criticism and the
Growth of Knowledge 1-3 (Cambridge, 1970), reprinted in Thomas Kuhn, The Essential
Tension 266 (Chicago, 1977); and Karl Popper, Normal Science and its Dangers, in Criti-
cism and the Growth of Knowledge at 51.
145 Kuhn, Structure at viii (cited in note 144) ("I take [paradigms] to be universally
recognized scientific achievements that for a time provide model problems and solutions to a
community of practitioners."). An example of a "paradigm" in this sense is Ptolemy's com-
putations of planetary position. Id at 23. Elsewhere in The Structure of Scientific Revolu-
tions, Kuhn uses the term "paradigm" more loosely, at times embracing the entire set of
beliefs and methodological and instrumental commitments shared by a community of scien-
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derlying theories and assumptions on which they are based, form
the core of what Kuhn calls a "normal science" research tradi-
tion.146 Most scientists spend most of their time engaged in normal
science, attempting to solve esoteric problems posed by the pre-
vailing traditions and theories in their fields.14 Kuhn asserts that
the aim of these scientists is not to test or falsify prevailing theo-
ries, but rather to reconcile empirical observations with theories to
which they are already intellectually committed. 48 During periods
of normal science, scientists are unlikely to challenge research
claims that corroborate theories underlying the prevailing research
tradition.
Scrutiny of prior claims may be more likely, and free access to
prior research thus more important, during those rare periods of
crisis in a field of research preceding what Kuhn calls "scientific
revolution."' 49 According to Kuhn, normal science leads inexorably
to such periods of crisis by generating anomalous results that can-
not be explained in terms of the prevailing theory.1 50 Eventually
the community loses confidence in its paradigms, and scientists
then exhibit the sort of critical skepticism that is traditionally at-
tributed to them as they assess the relative explanatory powers of
tists working in the same field. See Margaret Masterman, The Nature of a Paradigm, in
Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge at 59, 61-66 (cited in note 144) (identifying twenty-
one separate senses in which Kuhn uses the term "paradigm"); Compare Kuhn, Structure at
174, 175 (cited in note 144) (postscript, 1969) (acknowledging that he uses the term "para-
digm" in two separate senses: first, to signify "the entire constellation of beliefs, values,
techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given community"; and second, to signify
"one sort of element in that constellation, the concrete puzzle-solutions which, employed as
models or examples, can replace explicit rules as a basis for the solution of the remaining
puzzles of normal science"); see also Thomas Kuhn, Second Thoughts on Paradigms, in The
Essential Tension at 293 (cited in note 144).
"' Kuhn, Structure at 23-51 (cited in note 144).
147 Id at 23-24.
148 Id at 146-47.
149 Id at 52-91. Free access to prior research discoveries may also be important during
the early stages of research in a field before a widely accepted paradigm has emerged, when
competing schools offer competing theories and challenge each other's assumptions, hypoth-
eses, and observations. Id at 10-22. Access to applied research discoveries may be particu-
larly important to the progress of pre-paradigm research. Kuhn argues that the lack of a
generally accepted paradigm impedes systematic fact gathering in pre-paradigm science, re-
stricting analysis to data that are readily accessible. Id at 15. The prior discoveries of ap-
plied scientists may be especially important as a supplement to the limited knowledge gen-
erated by basic scientists before they have a paradigm to guide them in their research. The
practical problems addressed by applied research may in effect substitute for a scientific
paradigm in systematizing fact gathering by identifying appropriate areas of inquiry. Id at
16.
150 Id at 52-65.
1052 [56:1017
Patents and the Progress of Science
competing new theories. 151 The crisis ultimately comes to an end
when a new paradigm emerges that commands the allegiance of a
significant group of practitioners and forms the basis of a new nor-
mal science tradition.15  Kuhn notes that the scientists whose
achievements form the basis for new paradigms are almost always
either very young or very new to the field, and thus less committed
by prior practice to its normal science tradition.5 3  In the
meantime, adherents of the old paradigm continue to defend it and
seek to elaborate upon it in ways that reconcile apparently anoma-
lous empirical observations with the predictipns of the paradigm-
based theory."
During these periods of "extraordinary science," when new
theories compete with old theories for the allegiance of a scientific
community, free access to prior discoveries may be essential in or-
der to put the proponents of new theories in a position to challenge
their predecessors and offer alternative explanations for previous
observations. If scientists were able to limit access to their discov-
eries, they might make them available only to those who shared
their intellectual commitments, making it difficult for proponents
of new theories to perform the experiments necessary in order to
offer new interpretations of research results. 55 Free access to prior
discoveries may thus be critical in allowing newcomers to the field
to challenge the achievements of more established figures.
Free access to prior research discoveries thus serves the inter-
est of the scientific community in checking the validity of research
results by facilitating scrutiny of scientists' claims. Critical scru-
1*1 Id at 77-91.
152 Id at 84-86, 150-59.
" Id at 90. For a related analysis, see Michael J. Mulkay, The Social Process of Inno-
vation: A Study in the Sociology of Science 34-45 (Macmillan, 1972) (arguing that intellec-
tual migration, followed by modified application of imported techniques from another field,
is more common than radical redefinition of paradigms from within a field).
' Kuhn, Structure at 77-80. See also Mitroff, The Subjective Side of Science at 61-73
(cited in note 130) (noting that scientists often remain committed to theories in the face of
what others regard as falsifying evidence and suggesting that such strong intellectual com-
mitments may be functional for science); and Bernard Barber, Resistance by Scientists to
Scientific Discovery, 134 Science 596 (1961) (arguing that scientists resist new discoveries
because of conflict with substantive concepts, methodological conceptions, or religious ideas;
or because of patterns of social interaction based on professional standing, specialization,
conflict among "schools," and seniority).
155 See generally Diana Crane, Invisible Colleges: Diffusion of Knowledge in Scientific
Communities 41-65 (Chicago, 1972) (noting that informal communications among scientists
tend to be dominated by a small number of productive scientists who play a key role in the
dissemination of information and exercise considerable influence over theoretical commit-
ments and future directions of research in their fields).
1989] 1053
The University of Chicago Law Review
tiny of research claims may be far less common than the popular
image of science would suggest. Nonetheless, some such scrutiny
undoubtedly occurs. Harriet Zuckerman suggests that scrutiny of
prior research claims is most likely when the results are either
anomalous or particularly significant for subsequent research.156
While this pattern of limited replication may allow some false re-
search claims to enter the scientific literature without objection,
Zuckerman argues that focusing scrutiny on particularly significant
research results is an efficient way of allocating the scarce re-
sources available to the scientific community for replicating prior
work.'
Anomalous research results may be dismissed as research fail-
ures and overlooked by scientists committed to a prevailing para-
digm during periods of normal science, and then reexamined later
during the crisis preceding a scientific revolution. Significant non-
anomalous research results may be accepted without objection so
long as they confirm the predictions of prevailing theories in the
field, and then called into question when their deficiencies are ex-
posed as an unintended by-product of efforts to extend them.158
Either way, free access to prior discoveries ensures that the com-
munity will be able to scrutinize research results when it needs to
use them or when it is ready to pay attention to them.
Some scrutiny of research results might occur by permission or
license even without free access to prior discoveries. Some scien-
tists might want their colleagues to scrutinize their results in order
to confirm their discoveries and obtain recognition. 59 Nonetheless,
there are good reasons why the scientific community might con-
sider "licensed access" a poor substitute for free access as a means
of providing for scrutiny of research claims. First, to the extent
that scrutiny of research claims is potentially antagonistic to the
"I Zuckerman, Deviance and Social Change at 94-95 (cited in note 129).
157 Id at 95-96.
18 Id at 93. See also Broad and Wade, Betrayers of the Truth at 77 (cited in note 129).
1I Norman Storer explains compliance with the norm of communality in terms of indi-
vidual motivation rather than social function, noting that scientists contribute their discov-
eries to the scientific community in order to obtain "competent response" from professional
colleagues. Storer, Social System of Science at 83-84 (cited in note 3). According to Storer,
the desire for response that motivates scientists is more than simply a desire for the practi-
cal benefits that go with favorable recognition, such as fame, prizes, research funding, and
professional advancement. Recognition of one's achievements by other scientists is an inte-
gral part of the discovery process, providing essential confirmation and validation for scien-
tists' cognitive evaluations of their discoveries. Id at 20-21, 66-73. See also Hagstrom, The
Scientific Community at 12-23 (cited in note 3) (asserting that scientists contribute their
discoveries to the scientific community in order to receive recognition).
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interests of the prior researcher, requiring a license from that re-
searcher is bound to compromise the credibility and effectiveness
of the process. Researchers might tend to submit their results to
the scrutiny only of like-minded colleagues who are predisposed to
accept their claims and who will not challenge their fundamental
assumptions. Moreover, the limited data available on the willing-
ness of scientists to share their research results with other investi-
gators suggests that many scientists in fact choose to withhold
from the scientific community the means of scrutinizing their re-
search claims. °60 Finally, subsequent researchers will rarely be in-
terested in replicating prior research, even when they are free to do
so, unless they seek either to falsify it or to extend it in their own
work. Thus scrutiny is most likely to occur, and most important
for the progress of science, when it conflicts with the interests of
the prior researcher. In these circumstances free access may be
necessary to ensure that effective scrutiny may proceed.
2. Facilitating new research.
In addition to permitting scrutiny of research claims, free ac-
cess promotes scientific progress by permitting other scientists to
use prior discoveries in subsequent research. Functionalist ac-
counts of scientific norms stress the cumulative nature of scientific
discovery, noting that new discoveries build upon prior discover-
ies. 1 ' Scientists have been proclaiming their indebtedness to the
research of their predecessors for centuries-a sentiment that is
vividly pictured in Isaac Newton's famous epigram: "If I have seen
farther, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants.' 6 2
It may be that most if not all new discoveries build upon prior
discoveries, and that scientists therefore need to use prior discov-
eries in order to advance the state of scientific knowledge. But it
100 See note 134 and sources cited therein.
See, for example, Merton, in The Sociology of Science at 273, 346-52 (cited in note
2) ("The substantive findings of science are a product of social collaboration and are as-
signed to the community."); and Barber, Science and the Social Order at 197, 198-206
(cited in note 2) ("... inventions and discoveries are in their very essence accumulations of
previously existing elements, accumulations in which a degree of novelty may be present but
may also be very small when the past is considered"); Gilfillan, The Sociology of Invention
at 5-13 (cited in note 36); Ogburn, Social Change at 73-118 (cited in note 36); William F.
Ogburn and Dorothy Thomas, Are Inventions Inevitable? A Note on Social Evolution, 37
Pol Sci Q 83 (1922). See also Kuhn, Structure at 52, 92 (cited in note 44) (asserting that
while normal science is cumulative, scientific revolutions are non-cumulative transitions be-
tween incompatible and incommensurable world views).
161 For an exhaustive and entertaining account of the origins of this epigram, see Rob-
ert K. Merton, On the Shoulders of Giants: A Shandean Postscript (Free Press, 1965).
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does not necessarily follow that subsequent researchers need to en-
joy free access to such discoveries; they might instead obtain li-
censes from prior researchers. In other words, contractual arrange-
ments among scientists holding exclusive rights in discoveries
might substitute for communal ownership as a means of regulating
the use of prior discoveries in subsequent research.
The interests of the subsequent researcher (and of the scien-
tific community as a whole) are less clearly at odds with the inter-
ests of the earlier researcher in the case of subsequent efforts to
extend prior research than they are in the case of subsequent ef-
forts to scrutinize prior research claims. Although prior researchers
still stand to lose professional status if subsequent research calls
into question the validity of their claims, they also stand to gain
further recognition and status if their prior discoveries prove im-
portant to future discoveries.16 3 One might therefore expect scien-
tists to be eager to extend licenses to those who would use their
discoveries in subsequent research.
Nonetheless, there are a number of reasons why access to prior
discoveries that is contingent on obtaining a license from the origi-
nal discoverer might be a less satisfactory means of promoting sci-
entific progress than free access to such discoveries.
The most obvious reason is that it is cheaper and easier to
obtain free access to prior discoveries than it is to obtain licenses
from prior researchers. Even assuming that most prior researchers
would be willing, once consulted, to allow subsequent researchers
to use their discoveries free of charge, it would be costly and bur-
densome for scientists to negotiate for licenses with each of the
prior researchers whose work contributes to their own."" More-
over, since research often leads down unexpected paths, it may be
difficult to foresee just which prior discoveries will prove useful in
a research project.6 5 Interrupting an ongoing research project to
obtain a license to use a prior discovery that has unexpectedly
proved relevant to the inquiry could cause wasteful delays. These
10 Hagstrom, The Scientific Community at 23-28 (cited in note 3); Ravetz, Scientific
Knowledge and its Social Problems at 246-47 (cited in note 2).
14 See generally Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Eco-
nomic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 Colum L Rev 1600 (1983)
(arguing that the fair use privilege in copyright law serves in part to exempt from infringe-
ment liability socially desirable uses of copyrighted works that could not be achieved
through consensual agreements because of "market failure" for reasons such as prohibitive
transaction costs).
16' This factor could also make it difficult to agree on the value of access to a particular
discovery in negotiating a license at the outset of a research project.
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transaction costs alone could add up to a significant burden for
researchers.
Free access also spares subsequent researchers the cost of pay-
ing royalties to their predecessors for the use of their discoveries.
To the extent that prior researchers might otherwise charge such
royalties, free access in effect provides a subsidy for subsequent
research. 6 ' Research subsidies may be especially appropriate for
basic research that generates substantial public benefits yet cannot
pay its own way in the market.167 Research is a costly and uncer-
tain enterprise, and it often yields unexpected benefits to those
who have not paid for it.""8 The argument for subsidy may be less
compelling when extended to research sponsored by private com-
panies in the expectation of earning a profit, or to applied research
the results of which may be effectively monopolized through patent
protection or secrecy. But even if a subsidy is appropriate, it does
not necessarily follow that prior researchers should bear the bur-
den of this subsidy rather than society as a whole. It might be
fairer and more efficient (ignoring the transaction costs outlined
above) for the government to subsidize research in amounts suffi-
cient to allow researchers to pay for access to the prior discoveries
they need to use in their research. On the other hand, considera-
tions of fairness might argue for placing this burden on prior re-
searchers, given that in all likelihood they themselves benefitted
from the free availability of earlier research results in making their
own discoveries. 69 Researchers who themselves benefitted from ac-
cess to the discoveries of scientists who came before them might
fairly be called upon to make similar contributions to the efforts of
scientists who come after them.170
Free access may also be necessary in order to override the in-
terest of prior researchers in keeping their discoveries away from
research competitors. 7 1 Scientists may want to carve out a domain
of exclusivity in subsequent research for themselves and their col-
1" Congress may have been motivated in part by the purpose of subsidizing research in
enacting specific exemptions from patent infringement liability for the experimental use of
inventions in fields of research dominated by federal funding, such as agriculture and
atomic energy. See note 6.
16 See Nelson, 67 J Pol Econ at 304-06 (cited in note 33).
lo Id at 302-04.
This argument is, of course, somewhat circular. absent a prevailing rule of free ac-
cess, there would be no reason to presume that researchers had benefitted from free access
to the prior discoveries of others. Nonetheless, a significant amount of accumulated knowl-
edge has always been freely available to both basic and applied scientists.
170 Barber, Science and the Social Order at 91 (cited in note 2).
171 See Eisenberg, 97 Yale L J at 197-98, 203-05 (cited in note 3).
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laborators in order to improve their odds of being first to make
future discoveries. They may see other researchers working on sim-
ilar problems as competitors who threaten to divert future recogni-
tion, research grants, and even commercial intellectual property
rights in the output of research using the prior discovery. 1 2
Finally, free access allows subsequent researchers to bypass
the theoretical perspectives of their predecessors, thereby promot-
ing the simultaneous pursuit of diverse and possibly inconsistent
theoretical approaches to future inquiry. Scientists often hold
strong intellectual commitments to particular ideas and theories
that dominate their choices of research problems, interpretations
of research results, and reactions to the work of other scientists.7 3
Such commitments are at the heart of Kuhn's "normal science.' 74
Ian Mitroff has documented this phenomenon in interviews with a
group of forty-two scientists involved in the Apollo lunar mis-
sions. 5 Mitroff's interviewees suggest a number of reasons why
strong commitments to particular viewpoints or theories even in
the face of contradictory evidence might play a beneficial role in
science. Commitment serves to motivate scientists and enhances
the visibility of their viewpoints. 76 It also makes it more likely
that someone will identify supporting data and present the argu-
ments in favor of a theory and that the theory will not suffer a
"premature death" for lack of an advocate.'7
Whatever the beneficial effects of intellectual commitments
among scientists, such commitments can also work to suppress the
emergence of new theories and thus ultimately to retard scientific
progress. Paul Feyerabend argues that a proliferation of theories
172 Storer, Social System of Science at 129-31 (cited in note 3). For a recent example of
an academic scientist withholding a potentially important discovery from research competi-
tors, see Leslie Roberts, Race for Cystic Fibrosis Gene Nears End, 240 Science 282 (1988).
17 See Mitroff, The Subjective Side of Science at 61-73 (cited in note 130); Kuhn,
Structure at 24, 35, 40-41, 64-65, 77-80, 100-01, 150-52 (cited in note 144); Mulkay, The
Social Process of Innovation at 9-17 (cited in note 153); Mitroff, 39 Am Soc Rev at 585-91
(cited in note 130); and Stephen G. Brush, Should the History of Science Be Rated X?, 183
Science 1164 (1974). See also Michael J. Mulkay, Some Aspects of Cultural Growth in the
Natural Sciences, 36 Soc Research 22, 31-39 (1969) (arguing that the body of established
knowledge within a field influences scientists more than the social norms identified by
Newton).
174 See notes 144-148 and accompanying text.
176 Mitroff, The Subjective Side of Science (cited in note 130); and Mitroff, 39 Am Soc
Rev 579 (cited in note 130). The scientists interviewed unanimously indicated that the pop-
ular notion of the objective, emotionally disinterested scientist was naive. Mitroff, 39 Am
Soc Rev at 587.
176 Id at 588.
177 Id at 588-89.
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through scientific "anarchy" is more conducive to improving
knowledge than "the determined application of a preferred ideol-
ogy.' 7 8 Feyerabend acknowledges that a certain amount of tenac-
ity in commitment to a theory is desirable because theories may
eventually be improved in a manner that accommodates initial dif-
ficulties and because experimental results are not always relia-
ble. 79 Rather than arguing against such tenacity, Feyerabend sug-
gests that the growth of knowledge will be better served by "the
active interplay of various tenaciously held views" than by the
dominance of a single view as depicted by Kuhn in his discussion
of normal science. 80
Free access to prior discoveries may be necessary to ensure
such a proliferation of viewpoints. If scientists are in a position to
control who gets access to their discoveries, they might be inclined
to favor a narrow range of researchers who share their commit-
ments and to withhold their discoveries from scientists with differ-
ent perspectives. Informal networks of communication among
scientists may reinforce the intellectual commitments of leading
scientists in a field, with established scientists choosing as collabo-
rators those who share their basic viewpoints and resisting the rev-
olutionary ideas of newcomers. Allowing earlier researchers to exer-
cise such control over the course of subsequent research might
thereby prolong the influence of prevailing theories and stifle crea-
tivity and originality. Free access to scientific discoveries thus pro-
motes scientific progress by permitting widespread use of prior dis-
coveries in subsequent research by scientists with different
intellectual commitments and perspectives.
3. Individualism versus coordination in research.
Implicit in the foregoing discussion is the idea that free access
promotes scientific progress by fostering individualism and inde-
pendence in research. Traditional scientific norms hold that indi-
vidual scientists should be free to select their own research
problems, methods, and techniques and decide for themselves
whether their research results and the results of other scientists
178 Paul Feyerabend, Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge
37-53 (NLB, 1975). Feyerabend argues that consideration of alternative theories may be
necessary in order to find a perspective from which it is possible to observe facts that
demonstrate the limitations of the theory under analysis. Id at 42-43.
178 Paul Feyerabend, Consolations for the Specialist, in Lakatos and Musgrave, eds,
Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge at 197, 204 (cited in note 144).
18O Id at 201-09.
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are valid or invalid.181 These norms are particularly strong in aca-
demic science, where they are fortified by traditions of academic
freedom.182 Industrial scientists generally have less freedom in
their choice of research problems and work under closer supervi-
sion than academic researchers.183 But even in industry, research
scientists often enjoy considerable professional autonomy within
broadly defined areas of interest to the firm, especially when they
perform basic research."84
The independence of scientists in the day to day conduct of
research promotes progress by enabling scientists to exploit their
expertise fully and to make use of new information as they acquire
it in the course of their investigations, without needing to comply
with instructions or justify their activities to supervisors.185 Coordi-
nation or central planning of research weakens the initiative of re-
searchers and substitutes the judgment of the research coordinator
for that of the individuals who are actually immersed in the details
of the research. This can be a major problem for industrial
research.""e
,1' See Barber, Science and the Social Order at 65 (cited in note 2). Barber explains:
[S]cience rejects the imposition of any truth by organized and especially by non-scien-
tific authority. The canons of validity for scientific knowledge are also individualistic:
they are vested not in any formal organization but in the individual consciences and
judgments of scientists who are, for this function, only informally organized. Some of
the resentment which scientists feel against so-called "planning" in science ... derives
from their individualistic fear that formally organized authority will be substituted for
the informal judgments of peers in the control of science.
Id. See also Hagstrom, The Scientific Community at 105 (cited in note 3). Michael Mulkay
argues that this functionalist account of the role of individualism in scientific progress has
its origins in ideological claims used by scientists in efforts to obtain public support for
science while avoiding outside interference with their work. Michael J. Mulkay, Norms and
Ideology in Science, 15 Soc Sci Information 637, 648-50 (1976).
182 See generally Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Academic Freedom and Academic Values in
Sponsored Research, 66 Tex L Rev 1363, 1364-74 (1988) and sources cited therein.
183 Hagstrom, The Scientific Community at 107-09 (cited in note 3); Kornhauser,
Scientists in Industry at 16-82 (cited in note 3); and Barber, Science and the Social Order
at 167-68 (cited in note 2). --
18 Kornhauser, Scientists in Industry at 25-33, 64-65 (cited in note 3); Nelson, Science
and Invention, at 570-77 (cited in note 4) (evaluating the research policy of Bell Telephone
Laboratories).
185 Hagstrom, The Scientific Community at 107-08 (cited in note 3).
188 As William Kornhauser observes: "Bureaucratic control ... considerably weakens
professional initiative and incentive, and therefore creativity and innovation. Bureaucratic
organization is not conducive to the search for new ideas and applications, nor is it likely to
encourage or exploit serendipity in research." Kornhauser, Scientists in Industry at 44
(cited in note 3). Joseph Ben-David's comparative studies of the growth of science in differ-
ent societies offer empirical support for the related thesis that centralized organization of
academic institutions hinders scientific progress, while a loose and competitive structure
promotes progress. Joseph Ben-David, Scientific Productivity and Academic Organization
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Discussions of academic freedom have traditionally empha-
sized the importance of protecting professional researchers from
the exercise of authority by non-scientists.87 But interference by
scientific peers also compromises individualism in science and vio-
lates scientific norms.188 Free access to prior discoveries removes
an obstacle to individualism by allowing scientists to proceed with
their research plans without having to obtain the approval of prior
researchers whose discoveries they need to use.
Michael Polanyi argues that "independent initiatives" by com-
peting scientists working with knowledge of each other's achieve-
ments assures the most efficient possible organization of scientific
research, and that any effort to coordinate or control the work of
scientists can only impede progress.""9 So long as all scientists are
aware of the work of the others, they will take this work into ac-
count in formulating and adjusting their own research efforts with-
out any need for imposed coordination. Polanyi likens this system
of "coordination by mutual adjustment of independent initiatives"
to what happens when a group of persons jointly fits together the
pieces of a large jigsaw puzzle. 9 ° Each person, working within sight
of the others, will focus on a particular segment of the puzzle and
watch out for opportunities that arise as each piece of the puzzle
falls into place. If one person attempts to organize the group, its
joint effectiveness will be reduced to that of the single person di-
recting the enterprise. The same, he asserts, is true for science:
So long as each scientist keeps making the best contribution
of which he is capable, and on which no one could improve
(except by abandoning the problem of his own choice and
thus causing an overall loss to the advancement of science),
we may affirm that the pursuit of science by independent self-
coordinated initiatives assures the most efficient possible or-
ganization of scientific progress. . . . [A]ny authority which
would undertake to direct the work of the scientist centrally
would bring the progress of science virtually to a standstill.'
in Nineteenth Century Medicine, 25 Am Soc Rev 828 (1960). See also Joseph Ben-David,
The Scientist's Role in Society (Prentice-Hall, 1971).
187 See generally Eisenberg, 66 Tex L Rev at 1365-67 (cited in note 182) and sources
cited therein.
18 Hagstrom, The Scientific Community at 106 (cited in note 2).
189 Michael Polanyi, The Republic of Science: Its Political and Economic Theory, 1
Minerva 54, 56 (1962).
190 Id at 55.
"I Id at 56.
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This argument for independence among scientists explicitly
posits that each scientist is aware of what the others are doing.
The efficiency of independent research efforts is less apparent
when, in the absence of coordination, scientists would work in se-
crecy without knowledge of each other's progress. Scientists work-
ing in secrecy cannot adjust their activities in response to the ef-
forts of the others and might therefore be more likely to duplicate
each other's work or otherwise waste their time.
By relieving scientists of the need to obtain permission from
their predecessors to use their discoveries in subsequent research,
free access makes it easier for scientists to work in secrecy. Con-
ventional accounts of scientific norms stress the importance of
open disclosure while broadly condemning secrecy as inimical to
scientific progress.192 Yet sociologists of science acknowledge that,
at least in certain stages of research, scientists are often reluctant
to discuss their work with rivals.193 Moreover, there is reason to
believe that secrecy is underreported by scientists who hesitate to
acknowledge departures from scientific norms.9
Reluctance to acknowledge the prevalence of secrecy may have
inhibited consideration of its possible benefits for research science.
Ian Mitroff has cautiously suggested some possible functions of a
"counter-norm" of secrecy in science on the basis of his interviews
with Apollo moon scientists. 95 He notes that although "[o]n the
face of it, it would seem absurd to contend that there could be an
opposing norm [to Merton's norm of communism] having some
positive function in science," his data suggest that secrecy in sci-
ence might serve as a protective device to prevent theft of ideas
and to avoid disputes over priority, as well as serving as an ac-
192 See notes 120-26 and sources cited therein.
See, for example, Jerry Gaston, Originality and Competition in Science 116-29
(Chicago, 1973); Hagstrom, The Scientific Community at 88-98 (cited in note 3); Zucker-
man, in Deviance and Social Change at 102-04 (cited in note 129); and Warren 0. Hag-
strom, Competition in Science, 39 Am Soc Rev 1, 8-10 (1974).
Zuckerman reconciles some instances of secrecy with the scientific norm of communism
by noting that the Mertonian norms apply only to the "public" stages of science, when the
research is ready for competent evaluation by peers in the scientific community. Zuckerman,
in Deviance and Social Change at 103 (cited in note 129), citing Joseph Ben-David, Organi-
zation, Social Control and Cognitive Change in Science, in Joseph Ben-David and T. Clark,
eds, Culture and its Creators: Essays in Honor of Edward Shils 244, 265 (Chicago, 1977).
'" See Hagstrom, The Scientific Community at 88-89 (cited in note 3) (reporting in-
consistent accounts of prevalence of secrecy by colleagues in the same departments, and
suggesting that because it conflicts with scientific norms, "secrecy itself must usually be
kept secret").
I'l Mitroff, The Subjective Side of Science at 75-79 (cited in note 130); and Mitroff, 39
Am Soc Rev at 591-93 (cited in note 130).
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knowledgement to oneself and others that one has work in progress
that is worth protecting.19
Scientists depend on publication to establish their entitle-
ments to recognition for their discoveries. Disclosure prior to pub-
lication leaves scientists vulnerable to having their ideas appropri-
ated by others, preventing them from reaping the reward of
recognition for priority of discovery. Pre-publication secrecy in re-
search science may serve a function analogous to that of pre-patent
secrecy in industrial research and development, supplying interim
protection from free riders in order to preserve incentives to de-
velop an idea that may not yet be protected in any other man-
ner. 197 If subsequent researchers needed to obtain permission from
prior researchers before using their discoveries, they might have to
disclose their ideas and plans to their research rivals. Since the sci-
entific community does not recognize exclusive rights in research
plans or ideas, these rivals would then be free to pursue the same
research on their own and to publish the results without obligation
to those whose unpublished ideas they pursued. Permitting free ac-
dess to prior discoveries preserves the incentives of subsequent re-
searchers to develop new research plans and ideas by allowing
them to keep their plans and ideas to themselves until they are
ready to publish their results in exchange for the reward of recog-
nition. Allowing secrecy in the early stages of research may thus be
a benefit rather than a drawback of a system that promotes indi-
vidualism and independence in research, although it is not gener-
ally touted as such.
Even when secrecy and lack of coordination lead to duplica-
tive research, such duplication is not necessarily wasteful. Robert
Merton has identified several ways that having multiple scientists
or teams of scientists work toward solutions of the same problem
promotes the growth of knowledge. 98 The less routine the scien-
tific effort and the more far-reaching the implications of the re-
sults, the less likely it is that overlapping research efforts will
prove wasteful.1 99 Multiple simultaneous research efforts enhance
the likelihood that a problem will be solved quickly.200 Moreover,
", Mitroff, 39 Am Soc Rev at 592-93 (cited in note 130).
See text accompanying note 223.
" Robert K. Merton, Multiple Discoveries as Strategic Research Site, in Merton, The
Sociology of Science at 371, 378-81 (cited in note 2); and Merton, The Matthew Effect in
Science, in Merton, The Sociology of Science at 439, 450-51 (cited in note 2). See also Hag-
strom, 39 Am Soc Rev at 15-16 (cited in note 193).
" Merton, in The Sociology of Science at 379 (cited in note 2).
20 Id at 378-79.
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when multiple scientists arrive at the same conclusion, the redun-
dancy improves the likelihood that the discovery will be incorpo-
rated in current scientific knowledge.20 1 Given the high volume of
scientific literature competing for the attention of readers, new sci-
entific information may need to be publicized repeatedly before it
reaches and makes an impact on those who have a use for it. 202
Multiple independent discoveries help establish the validity of new
research claims, serving as a substitute for after-the-fact replica-
tion.203 The lack of incentives to replicate already completed work
may make simultaneous replication of research by competing
scientists particularly important as a mechanism for validating re-
search results.
Duplicative research efforts will rarely be entirely redun-
dant.2 4 Different investigators working independently on the same
problems will generally use somewhat different approaches and
make different mistakes.20 5 If they obtain different results, more
will be known than if only one of them had undertaken the investi-
gation. Moreover, different investigators will often make different
observations and draw different conclusions from the same data,
particularly when an experiment leads to unexpected or anomalous
'0' Id at 380, 450; and Hagstrom, 39 Am Soc Rev at 15 (cited in note 193).
202 See Herbert Menzel, Scientific Communication: Five Themes from Social Science
Research, 21 Am Psychologist 999, 1000-01 (1966).
203 Merton, in The Sociology of Science at 380 (cited in note 2).
21 The value of overlapping research efforts is reflected in the high rate at which scien-
tists publish research results even after they have been anticipated by others. In a survey of
U.S. academic scientists, Warren Hagstrom found that 68-78 percent of experimental physi-
cists, chemists, and biologists either published or planned to publish research results that
had already been anticipated. Hagstrom, 39 Am Soc Rev at 4 (Table 2) (cited in note 193).
Roughly half of the scientists whose work had been anticipated published or planned to
publish their results because their work was different from the previously published results,
and a considerably smaller percentage published or planned to publish their work because
of the value of replication. Id.
Unfortunately, Hagstrom's data do not distinguish between actual publications and
mere plans to publish. Actual publications are a better measure of value than plans to pub-
lish, since actual publication requires a determination by peer reviewers that the research
merits publication. Actual publications would also have a bearing on incentives to replicate
previous scientific work. See notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
20 Merton, in The Sociology of Science at 451 n 30 (cited in note 2) (quoting the fol-
lowing remarks by a Nobel laureate on duplication of research effort: "I think that if there
are different groups in different laboratories working on the same thing, their approach is
sufficiently different [to increase the probability of a successful outcome]. On the whole, this
is a good thing and not something that should be avoided for the sake of efficiency.") (citing
Harriet Zuckerman, Scientific Elite: Nobel Laureates in the United States (Free Press,
1977)). See also Feyerabend, in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge at 204 (cited in
note 179).
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results. 208 Different investigators are also likely to perceive differ-
ent implications for subsequent research in a single discovery.2°
The fact that duplicative research efforts serve a valuable
function does not necessarily argue against coordination of re-
search efforts through a system of exclusive rights in research dis-
coveries. To the extent that overlapping research efforts by differ-
ent scientists promise to enhance the value of prior discoveries, one
might expect the holders of exclusive rights in such discoveries to
authorize such efforts willingly without a rule of free access. But
coordinated research efforts cannot perform the same function as
multiple independent, non-cooperative research efforts by compet-
ing investigators. Coordination is bound to compromise the inde-
pendence of the researchers working on the problem and thereby
reduce the efficiency of the overall effort. Moreover, a coordinated
research effort is likely to involve like-minded scientists with a
shared sense of purpose and shared intellectual commitments.
Such scientists are less likely to see the limits of each other's ap-
proaches than are hostile rivals or scientists with different objec-
tives and perspectives.
4. Summary.
Free access to prior discoveries performs a critical function in
the system of social control in science by permitting scrutiny of
research claims by scientific peers. It thereby allows the scientific
community to challenge the validity of prior discoveries and to es-
tablish the value of the research contributions of its members. Free
access also facilitates scientific progress by permitting subsequent
investigators to use prior discoveries in their research without hav-
ing to go to the trouble and expense of obtaining permission from
their predecessors. It thereby lowers the costs of research and per-
mits the simultaneous pursuit of divergent and even inconsistent
approaches to further research emanating from prior discoveries.
Finally, free access promotes scientific progress by fostering inde-
pendence among scientists, allowing individual researchers to work
20' Kuhn, Structure at 64 (cited in note 144) (noting that in normal science researchers
often see only what is expected in their results, even under circumstances where scientists
later perceive an anomaly).
207 Hagstrom, 39 Am Soc Rev at 15 (cited in note 193). See also Bernard Barber and
Renee C. Fox, The Case of the Floppy-Eared Rabbits, in Bernard Barber and Walter
Hirsch, eds, The Sociology of Science (Free Press, 1963) (comparing the research activities
of two scientists who each accidentally collapsed rabbits' ears when injecting them intrave-
nously with papain; only one of the scientists determined an explanation for this phenome-
non through subsequent experiments).
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on the problems they choose in the manner they see fit without
needing to obtain approval from other scientists who may disagree
with their approaches, or having to disclose their plans to their re-
search rivals.
III. INTEGRATING THE Two PERSPECTIVES
The discussion so far has presented divergent perspectives on
how best to promote scientific progress, with divergent implica-
tions for whether patent holders should be able to enforce their
exclusive rights against subsequent researchers. The economic jus-
tifications for granting exclusive rights in new discoveries consid-
ered in section I do not supply an argument for a research exemp-
tion from patent infringement liability and, on certain
assumptions, seem to argue against such an exemption. On the
other hand, the discussion in section II suggests a number of rea-
sons for allowing researchers to enjoy free access to prior
discoveries.
A. Independence versus Coordination of Research
The argument of the sociologists of science in favor of individ-
ualism and independence in research as a means of promoting
progress conflicts with the prescription of the prospect theory in
favor of coordination of research initiatives by patent holders. The
prospect theory holds that such coordination promotes efficiency in
research, while the arguments presented in section II suggest that
coordination and control of research impedes progress and restricts
individual initiative and creativity.
This contradiction may be explained in part by a difference in
focus: the prospect theory is primarily concerned with promoting
efficiency in research, while the argument for individualism and in-
dependence takes the promotion of scientific progress to be an un-
qualified goal. Thus it might be argued that even if greater scien-
tific progress could be achieved through independent research
initiatives in a system of free access to prior discoveries than
through coordinated research efforts in a system of exclusive
rights, the additional progress to be expected in the former type of
system would not justify its greater costs in wasteful duplication of
research effort.
But beyond this difference in focus there appear to be further
differences in assumptions about the nature of research and the
role of the individual researcher. The argument for independence
among researchers makes more sense if research leads down unex-
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pected paths for which a course cannot be charted in advance, and
if the success of research projects depends on insights and creativ-
ity that may differ from one investigator to the next. In these cir-
cumstances, individual investigators will be better able to make de-
cisions about how to proceed with their own research projects than
any outside supervisor or coordinator could be.2 °0 On the other
hand, the prospect theory might make more sense if research is a
matter of systematic trial and error, in which the insights and crea-
tivity of individual investigators play little if any role. In these cir-
cumstances, there is little to be gained by leaving independent in-
vestigators to retrace each other's steps unwittingly, and the
efficiency of the overall effort might be improved by placing the
investigators under common supervision and control.
These different assumptions seem to correspond roughly to
differences in the nature of research projects typically pursued in
basic and applied research.209 The course of basic research projects
tends to be less predictable than that of applied research projects,
making coordination of research efforts more feasible and more
beneficial in the latter context. For example, coordination of re-
search efforts may be the most efficient way to develop a patented
industrial machine to the point of commercial feasibility. So long
as the subsequent research that is to be monitored and controlled
by patent holders is a matter of routine trial and error, the effi-
ciency gains from coordination probably outweigh any loss in indi-
vidual productivity arising from impediments to creativity and ini-
tiative in coordinated research. Moreover, coordination and control
offer greater benefits when researchers would otherwise be igno-
rant of each other's results. Basic researchers in academic institu-
tions are likely to know of each other's research results from publi-
cations or informal communications and thus do not need outside
coordinators to alert them to the achievements of their rivals,
while applied researchers in industry are likely to work in secrecy
108 See notes 185-91 and accompanying text.
209 It is interesting that the advocates of these divergent perspectives do not confine
their analyses to separate spheres of basic or applied research. Thus Kornhauser notes that
bureaucratic control retards industrial research as well as academic research (see note 186),
while Kitch suggests that coordination of research efforts might promote efficiency in basic
research as well as in applied research. Kitch cites Robert Merton's account of the wide-
spread phenomenon of "multiples" in scientific discovery and suggests that institutional
mechanisms to reduce redundancy in basic research efforts would be desirable. Kitch, 20 J L
& Econ at 288-89 n 70 (cited in note 54), citing Merton, in The Sociology of Science at 281-
412 (cited in note 2). Kitch overlooks Merton's thoughtful rejection of this view in some of
the cited pages. See notes 198-201, 203, and 205, and sources cited therein, and accompany-
ing text.
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unless they are compelled to disclose their results and to coordi-
nate their efforts in order to obtain patent licenses.
Independent, uncoordinated research efforts may be particu-
larly important to the progress of science when the most promising
course for subsequent research in the field of the invention is sub-
ject to dispute. In these circumstances, the arguments presented in
section II suggest good reasons for believing that, if patent holders
were given the power to coordinate and control access to their in-
ventions by subsequent researchers, they would do more harm
than good.
First, patent holders (or their scientific advisors) may have in-
tellectual commitments that prevent them from seeing the merits
of research proposals from scientists who do not share their basic
viewpoints. 10 They may therefore focus resources along lines of in-
quiry promising to confirm their own expectations and withhold
approval from projects based on competing theories that strike
them as less sound. A system of exclusive rights that allows prior
researchers to coordinate and control the research of their succes-
sors may thus tend to reinforce prevailing viewpoints and hinder
the advance of new ideas.
Second, scientists may be inclined to withhold their discover-
ies from their research rivals in order to enhance the likelihood
that they and their collaborators will be first to make additional
related discoveries in the future. 1 ' The stakes of scientific rivalries
could be magnified if future discoveries offered the promise of ad-
ditional patent rights as well as further recognition in the scientific
community, or if subsequent research threatened to destroy the
value of the prior researcher's patent monopoly by rendering the
patented invention technologically obsolete.
Third, even when lack of coordination of research efforts leads
competing scientists to cover the same ground, it is not clear that
the overlapping research efforts are wasteful from the standpoint
of research science. 1' Competing researchers will often have differ-
ent backgrounds and ideas and use different techniques. Moreover,
different investigators are likely to make different observations and
have different ideas for follow-up experiments, improving the
chances for serendipitous discoveries. Even completely duplicative
research efforts may serve a valuable function by confirming re-
search results and enhancing the likelihood that a discovery will be
210 See notes 144-54 and accompanying text.
2 See notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
212 See notes 198-207 and accompanying text.
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noticed. To the extent that patent rights serve to eliminate over-
lapping research efforts, they may be winnowing out a significant
amount of wheat along with the chaff.
Coordination and control are most likely to improve efficiency
for routine applied research projects, such as efforts to perfect a
patented machine. But since the results of such routine research
are unlikely to be patentable and will often fall squarely within the
scope of the underlying patent claims, researchers are unlikely to
invest in such improvements without first obtaining a license to
exploit the underlying technology commercially, even if the re-
search itself is exempt from infringement liability.21 Thus an ex-
perimental use exemption is unlikely to interfere with coordination
and control of the type of research for which the prospect theory
makes the most sense. In this context the prospect function should
be self-enforcing whether or not patent holders have a legal right
to stop subsequent researchers from developing their technological
prospects.
The prospect theory offers a theoretical basis for arguing that
patent holders should be allowed to control the use of their inven-
tions in subsequent research in order to promote efficiency in the
development of technological prospects. However, the courts have
never embraced this theory, and commentators have criticized it
on the ground that it rests on generally inaccurate assumptions
about the operation of the patent system.2 14 The prospect theory
also appears to rest on frequently inaccurate assumptions about
the nature of research. When the results of following various re-
search paths are uncertain and the discovery process involves a sig-
nificant measure of individual creativity, it is unlikely that the
overall efficiency of research would be improved by minimizing du-
plicative research efforts. The efficiency gains from coordinating
research are likely to be greatest for routine applied research
projects, but it is unlikely that an experimental use exemption
would interfere with the ability of patent holders to monitor and
control such research. One can therefore set aside objections to an
experimental use exemption based on the premise of the prospect
theory that it is desirable to permit patent holders to coordinate
and control subsequent research in the field of the invention, and
21' See text accompanying note 118 and text following note 104.
214 See notes 108, 114, and 117 and accompanying text, and sources cited therein. Spe-
cifically, these sources cast doubt on the validity of Kitch's assumptions that patents are
typically issued long before commercialization of an invention and that patents typically
extend protection to future related inventions.
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turn to a reconsideration of the traditional incentives justification
for patent protection in light of the arguments for free access
presented in section II.
B. Ex Ante Incentives versus Subsequent Progress
The argument that free access to prior discoveries promotes
scientific progress by lowering the cost of research is in part the
flip side of the argument that patents promote progress by offering
monopoly profits as an incentive to make and disclose new inven-
tions."15 These patent incentives depend on patent holders being
able to charge higher prices as monopolists than they would receive
under competitive conditions-but these higher prices necessarily
entail higher costs to users of patented inventions. This dimension
of the conflict between the two perspectives is to some extent
unavoidable.
Nonetheless, the conflict might not be quite as intractable as
it seems. To a certain extent, lawyers and economists calling for
exclusive rights in discoveries as a means of promoting progress
and sociologists of science praising free access to prior discoveries
as a means of promoting progress are proceeding from different as-
sumptions and analyzing different questions. For example, lawyers
and economists often assume that the alternative to exclusive
rights is secrecy,21 while sociologists of science tend to equate ex-
clusive rights with secrecy and take the alternative to be free ac-
cess to all prior discoveries. 1 Thus a shared sense that secrecy
hinders scientific progress leads these two groups of commentators
to opposite positions on the desirability of exclusive rights.
Each of these assumptions about the relationship between se-
crecy and exclusive rights makes a certain amount of sense in some
research settings. In strictly industrial research, often the only way
to keep free riders from appropriating an unpatented invention is
to keep it secret. Exclusive patent rights are seen as an alternative
to secrecy because patent protection makes secrecy impossible (by
requiring disclosure of the invention in order to get a patent) and
unnecessary (by conferring exclusive rights that survive disclo-
sure). By contrast, in strictly academic research exclusive rights
21 Another dimension of the cost savings to research users from free access that does
not correspond to profits for patent holders under a system of exclusive rights is the admin-
istrative costs involved in negotiating for licenses to use prior discoveries. See notes 164-65
and accompanying text.
216 See notes 45-53 and accompanying text.
217 See notes 120-28 and accompanying text.
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that survive disclosure are virtually unheard of.21 Secrecy and ex-
clusive rights tend to be equated because in most cases the only
way to preserve exclusivity in an idea or discovery is to keep it
secret. Disclosure through publication generally ends exclusivity by
making the discovery freely available to the scientific community.
When patent protection extends into fields that are of interest
to both academic and industrial scientists, neither of these as-
sumptions about the relationship between exclusive rights and se-
crecy is quite right. On one hand, researchers who are motivated to
earn scientific recognition may disclose their discoveries through
publication even without patent protection, calling into question
the assumption that exclusive patent rights are necessary to pre-
vent secrecy. Eliminating or weakening patent protection in such
fields might reduce disclosures of new discoveries from industrial
laboratories, but some academic scientists would undoubtedly con-
tinue to make and disclose new discoveries in exchange for scien-
tific rewards. On the other hand, patent protection brings about
disclosure while conferring exclusive rights, calling into question
the assumptions that exclusive rights are equivalent to secrecy and
that disclosure is equivalent to free availability of research results.
Patent protection can be expected to call forth disclosure of some
new discoveries that otherwise might not be made or disclosed,
while at the same time giving patent holders the right to restrict
the use of these discoveries. Disclosure through the patent system
in exchange for exclusive rights will generally be less valuable to
subsequent researchers than disclosure through a scientific publi-
cation coupled with an unqualified right to use the invention in
subsequent research. Subsequent researchers might nonetheless be
able to obtain licenses to use patented inventions in their research,
and the patent disclosure alone may sometimes benefit subsequent
researchers even if they are unable to use the invention.219
It is also worth noting that, for many research uses of pat-
ented inventions, the theoretical conflict between free access and
exclusive rights makes little practical difference. These include
uses that either do not come to the attention of patent holders or,
for whatever reason, do not provoke their objections. Making and
using a patented invention within a research laboratory is not very
s's Scientists can sometimes preserve exclusivity after publication by withholding ac-
cess to essential research materials, although this practice violates scientific norms. See Ei-
senberg, 97 Yale L J at 197-205 (cited in note 3).
,' For example, the disclosure of a patented invention might suggest to a subsequent
researcher an experiment that could be performed without infringing the patent claims.
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conspicuous and may never come to the attention of the patent
holder. Even if the patent holder knows about the use, it might not
be worth the trouble and expense of pursuing a lawsuit against a
researcher who does not represent a significant threat to the patent
holder's commercial interests. Some patent holders might not ob-
ject to the unlicensed use of their inventions in purely academic
research with no commercial applications (at least so long as the
lost royalties from such uses are insignificant), or in research in
unrelated fields. Moreover, some patent holders might not object
to the unlicensed use of their inventions in their own fields if they
think the research might open up new markets for their inventions
or improve upon them in ways that increase the value of their pat-
ent rights.220 If the patent holder does not object to the use, the
research is likely to proceed with or without a license, whether or
not it is exempt from infringement liability.
Patent protection will also not significantly restrict access by
subsequent researchers to inventions that are readily available on
the market from patent holders or their licensees at reasonable
prices. For example, subsequent researchers who wish to use a pat-
ented chemical in their research can generally buy the product in
the market at the same price that it is available to other consumers
without having to explain what they want to do with it. The sale of
a patented product, if authorized by the patent holder, carries with
it an implied license to use the product.221 If the patent holder is
charging a high enough price for the product, the researcher might
find it cheaper to make the product herself, but the researcher's
complaint in this context is no different than that of other con-
sumers of patented inventions.
But not all patented inventions are readily available on a li-
censed basis in an anonymous market. Some patented products
can only be obtained from the patent holder in a face to face trans-
action. It may also be necessary to negotiate with the patent holder
in order to obtain a license to use a patented process. In these con-
texts some patent holders will undoubtedly object to the use of
their inventions in subsequent research and, in the absence of an
experimental use exemption, might use their exclusive rights to
stop valuable research from proceeding. The risk that the parties
220 For example, the value of the patent would increase if a researcher made unpatent-
able improvements in the invention that the patent holder was then free to use, so long as
the original patent claims were broad enough that no one else could use the improved inven-
tion without a license from the patent holder.
221 United States v Univis Lens Co., 316 US 241, 249 (1942).
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will be unable to agree on terms for a license is greatest when sub-
sequent researchers want to use prior inventions to make further
progress in the same field in competition with the patent holder,
especially if the research threatens to render the patented inven-
tion technologically obsolete.222 In this situation the public interest
in continued scientific progress after the patent issues conflicts
with the patent holder's interest in prolonging the public's depend-
ence on the patented technology. The patent holder will see the
user as a competitor seeking to destroy the value of the patent mo-
nopoly rather than as another customer offering to contribute to
monopoly profits, and it is unlikely that the patent holder would
license the use unless compelled to do so.
One might object that if the subsequent research is truly valu-
able, the parties ought to be able to agree on license terms that
would be profitable for both of them. But there are a number of
reasons to believe that private bargaining between the parties in
this context would not lead to an efficient outcome. First, uncer-
tainty or disagreement as to the value of the patented invention,
the likely outcome of the research project, and the validity and
scope of the patent claims might make it difficult for the parties to
agree on a price for a license. It might be possible to work around
some of these problems through a license agreement that condi-
tions royalty obligations on detailed contingencies, but negotiating
the terms of such a license could be costly and burdensome. For
research projects requiring access to many different patented in-
ventions, these transaction costs could become insurmountable.
Second, if the subsequent researcher and the patent holder are re-
search rivals, the subsequent researcher might be reluctant to dis-
close valuable research plans to the patent holder in the course of
negotiations for fear that the patent holder will pursue the re-
search plans herself rather than extend a license to the re-
searcher.223 In other words, it might be impossible for the subse-
quent researcher to obtain a license without disclosing valuable
information that is not protectable as intellectual property. Subse-
quent researchers would have little incentive to apply their ingenu-
ity to developing research plans involving the use of patented in-
ventions if they could not protect those plans from appropriation
by patent holders. Third, the loss of monopoly profits to the patent
holder if the subsequent researcher succeeds in inventing around
the patent may be greater than the anticipated profits to the sub-
"' See text accompanying note 79.
213 See text accompanying note 197.
1989] 1073
The University of Chicago Law Review
sequent researcher of using the new technology in competition
with the patent holder, since the competitive technology will not
give the subsequent researcher a monopoly while the prior patent
holder remains in the market. In any of these circumstances, if the
research is to proceed at all, it will probably have to be without the
patent holder's permission.
But an exemption from infringement liability for research
users would deprive patent holders of some of the social value of
their inventions, thereby reducing the value of patents and weak-
ening patent incentives. Whether such an exemption is nonetheless
desirable in the interest of promoting continuing scientific progress
is ultimately an empirical question.
C. Recommendations
An experimental use exemption seems most likely to under-
mine critical patent incentives when the researcher is an ordinary
consumer of an invention with a primary or at least significant
market among research users. For example, an exemption from in-
fringement liability for research users of a patented laboratory ma-
chine would effectively eliminate the benefits of patent protection
for the invention.224 Nor does it seem likely that a research exemp-
tion is necessary to ensure that scientists will have access to such
an invention: the patent holder will see research users as potential
customers rather than hostile rivals and will want to extend li-
censes to them in order to extract the full value of the patent
monopoly.
The case for an experimental use exemption is strongest when
the subsequent researcher is using a patented invention to check
the validity of the patent holder's claims. Free access to patented
inventions for the limited purpose of permitting scrutiny of new
research claims serves the policies underlying the patent law as
well as the interests of research science. Indeed, patent law pro-
motes scrutiny of the research claims embodied in patented inven-
tions through its requirement that patent holders make enabling
224 A similar reduction in the value of the patent monopoly might arise in the case of an
invention that may be sold in its present form to non-research consumers, if the invention
also has significant value as an input to subsequent research. For example, the value of a
newly invented chemical may derive as much from its usefulness in facilitating the discovery
of other chemicals in future research as from its usefulness in its present form to non-re-
search consumers. If a patent on the chemical allowed the inventor to capture the value of
the chemical to non-research consumers but not its value as an input to subsequent re-
search, patent incentives to derive new chemicals would be reduced.
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disclosures of their inventions freely available to the public.225 Jus-
tice Story highlighted the importance of this interest in introduc-
ing the experimental use doctrine in Whittemore v Cutter,226 not-
ing that it should not constitute patent infringement to construct a
patented machine "for the purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency
of the machine to produce its described effects. 2 27 Story's analysis
suggests a function for the experimental use doctrine in the patent
system that is analogous to that of replication of scientific experi-
ments in the system of social control in science. Just as communi-
tarian norms in science provide a check against fraud or error in
research claims by subjecting research results to potential replica-
tion, free access to the enabling disclosures in issued patents pro-
vides a check against the issuance of a patent in exchange for dis-
closure of an inoperative invention by allowing interested members
of the public to test patented inventions in their laboratories.228 If
a patent disclosure proves inadequate to enable someone skilled in
the field of the invention to reduce the invention to practice, the
patent may be held invalid.2 9 Patent holders should not be able to
use their exclusive rights to block such scrutiny.
The conflict between the interests of the patent holder and the
interests of subsequent researchers seems most intractable when
the researchers are rivals of the patent holder seeking to make fur-
ther advances in the field of the invention. A research exemption
in this context may be necessary in order to enable valuable subse-
quent research to proceed, yet allowing the researchers to avoid
liability to the patent holder entirely would restrict the value of
the patent monopoly and reduce ex ante incentives to make pat-
entable inventions. An experimental use exemption in this context
reduces the value of the patent monopoly in two ways. First, it
deprives the patent holder of royalties that might otherwise be col-
225 For an analysis of the interaction between the patent law enabling disclosure re-
quirement and scientific norms concerning replicability of published research results, see
Eisenberg, 97 Yale L J at 207-17 (cited in note 3).
224 29 F Cases 1120 (CC D Mass 1813).
1,7 Id at 1121. See also Sawin v Guild, 21 F Cases 554, 555 (CC D Mass 1813) (noting
that the making of a patented machine "to ascertain the verity and exactness of the specifi-
cation" should not constitute infringement). For a fuller discussion of this aspect of the
experimental use defense, see Eisenberg, 97 Yale L J at 220-22 (cited in note 3).
2'28 The prospect of invalidating an issued patent may fortify otherwise weak incentives
for replication in science, making it worthwhile for competitors of the patent holder to test
patented inventions in their laboratories notwithstanding the lack of scientific rewards for
such an undertaking. See notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
228 Grant v Raymond, 31 US (6 Pet) 218, 247 (1832). See also Eisenberg, 97 Yale L J at
207-13 (cited in note 3).
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lected from researchers. Second, by lowering the cost to competi-
tors of inventing around the patent, it shortens the expected dura-
tion of the patent holder's effective monopoly. On the other hand,
an experimental use exemption lowers the costs of research at the
same time that it lowers the expected returns from making patent-
able inventions. Thus an experimental use exemption might de-
press inventive activity by reducing patent incentives, while at the
same time stimulating inventive activity by relieving researchers of
the burden of paying royalties to prior researchers for access to
their inventions. It is difficult to assess the net effect of such an
exemption on willingness to invest in research.
Depending on the scope of the patent claims and the results of
the subsequent research, it may not be necessary to give patent
holders any remedy at all for the use of their inventions in research
in order to protect their interests. For example, if a subsequent
researcher develops an improvement that falls within the scope of
the claims of the earlier patent, the financial interests of the pat-
ent holder may be adequately protected by allowing enforcement
of the patent after the research is completed when the improve-
ment is ready for commercial exploitation. So long as the subse-
quent researcher may not exploit the improvement commercially
without a license from the patent holder, an experimental use ex-
emption from infringement liability during the research stage
would not deprive the patent holder of an opportunity to recover a
fair share of the value of the improvement, and the exemption
therefore should not undermine patent incentives. On the other
hand, if the subsequent researcher is able to develop a substitute
technology that does not infringe the patent claims, denying the
patent holder a remedy for the research use could prevent the pat-
ent holder from earning an adequate return on the initial invest-
ment in developing the earlier patented invention.
It is often impossible to tell in advance whether a subsequent
researcher's use of a patented invention will lead to an improve-
ment falling within the scope of the claims of the prior patent or to
a substitute technology falling outside the patent claims. The un-
certainty arises in part because it is difficult to predict the course
and outcome of research projects, and in part because it is difficult
to determine the validity and scope of patent claims until these
matters are resolved in litigation.
These difficulties argue against giving patent holders an in-
junctive remedy to prevent subsequent researchers from using
their inventions to make further advances in the same field. Such a
remedy would compel subsequent researchers to negotiate with
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their rivals for a license before they could use patented inventions
in their research. Given the problems outlined above in negotiating
for a license under these circumstances, it is likely that in many
cases the parties would be unable to reach an agreement even
though the subsequent research might offer significant social
benefits.3 0
Nonetheless, in some cases it may be appropriate for a court
to require the researcher to pay a reasonable royalty to the patent
holder after the fact in order to be sure that the patent holder is
adequately compensated for the use of the patented invention.
Damages for the research use may be unnecessary if the original
patent is broad enough in scope to cover the improved technology
developed by the researcher. In this situation, the patent holder's
interests will be adequately protected by enforcement of the pat-
ent when the improved technology is ready for commercial ex-
ploitation. On the other hand, if the subsequent researcher uses
the patented invention to invent around the patent, developing a
new technology that may be exploited without infringing the pat-
ent claims, the patent holder will have no means of extracting pay-
ment from the researcher at the commercial exploitation stage. In
13o See text accompanying note 223. Denying injunctive relief against acts of patent
infringement that further the public interest is not without precedent. Section 283 of the
Patent Act allows the courts to grant injunctions in patent cases "in accordance with the
principles of equity... on such terms as the court deems reasonable." Patent Act, 35 USC §
283 (1982). Some courts have declined to enjoin acts of patent infringement when the de-
fendant's use of the invention furthers an important public interest. See, for example, City
of Milwaukee v Activated Sludge, Inc., 69 F2d 577, 593 (7th Cir 1934) (reversing district
court's grant of permanent injunction against infringement of patents relating to treatment
of sewage because of public health interest in not having raw sewage disposed of in Lake
Michigan, but affirming award of monetary damages); Vitamin Technologists, Inc. v Wis-
consin Alumni Research Foundation, 146 F2d 941, 956 (9th Cir 1944) (refusal of patent
holder to license manufacturers of oleomargarine to use patented process of producing vita-
min D in food by exposing it to ultraviolet radiation justified denial of injunctive relief
because of public interest in preventing disease of rickets among the poor, who are more
likely to consume oleomargarine than butter). The courts more commonly invoke the public
interest in denying a preliminary injunction than in denying a permanent injunction. See,
for example, Datascope Corp. v Kontron, Inc., 786 F2d 398, 401 (Fed Cir 1986) (affirming
denial of preliminary injunction against infringement of patent on an intra-aortic balloon
catheter on grounds, inter ala, that some patients would be harmed by unavailability of
defendant's device); Scripps Clinic and Research Foundation v Genentech, Inc., 666 F
Supp 1379, 1400-01 (N D Cal 1987) (denying preliminary injunction against infringement of
patent on Factor VIII:C, a protein that plays an essential role in blood clotting, on grounds,
inter alia, that hemophiliacs could suffer from delay in bringing defendant's potentially su-
perior product on the market); Rohm and Haas Co. v Mobil Oil Corp., 212 USPQ 354, 364-
65 (D Del 1981) (denying preliminary injunction against infringement of herbicide on
grounds, inter alia, of adverse effects on farm economy and crop yields due to unavailability
of herbicide).
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these circumstances, denying the patent holder a damage remedy
for the research use would undermine the value of the patent mo-
nopoly and lead to unjust enrichment of the researcher.
Determination of reasonable royalties is never an easy task.
When a patented invention is only one input in the development of
a subsequent invention, the courts should be careful not to set
damages at a level that deprives subsequent researchers of the re-
wards of their own superior insights or that makes it unprofitable
to exploit the new technology. Another factor to bear in mind in
awarding damages against subsequent researchers who use pat-
ented inventions in their research is that the same activities are
generally perfectly legal in other countries. A United States patent
does not confer the right to stop anyone from using the invention
overseas, and the patent laws of many other nations recognize an
experimental use exemption from infringement liability."1 Signifi-
cant damage awards against U.S. researchers for infringement of
U.S. patents could thus ultimately give foreign researchers an ad-
vantage over their U.S. competitors, leading companies to move
their research operations overseas.
In sum, I make the following recommendations concerning the
proper scope of an experimental use exemption from patent in-
fringement liability:
(1) Research use of a patented invention to check the ade-
quacy of the specification and the validity of the patent
holder's claims about the invention should be exempt from
infringement liability.
(2) Research use of a patented invention with a primary or
significant market among research users should not be ex-
empt from infringement liability when the research user is
an ordinary consumer of the patented invention.
(3) A patent holder should not be entitled to enjoin the use
of a patented invention in subsequent research in the field
of the invention, which could potentially lead to improve-
ments in the patented technology or to the development of
alternative means of achieving the same purpose. However,
it might be appropriate in some cases to award a reasonable
royalty after the fact to be sure that the patent holder re-
ceives an adequate return on the initial investment in de-
veloping the patented invention.
"I See note 6 and sources cited therein.
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IV. ILLUSTRATIONS
The proper scope of an experimental use privilege may be
clarified by considering specific patented inventions that have been
or are likely to be used in subsequent research. Two recently is-
sued patents with obvious implications for future biomedical re-
search illustrate different ways in which the experimental use issue
might arise. The first is a patent issued in 1982 and reissued in
1985 to Scripps Clinic and Research Foundation (Scripps) on a pu-
rified protein that is essential for blood clotting."' This patent is
the subject of a recent patent infringement action brought by
Scripps against Genentech, Inc."'5 The second is a patent issued in
1988 to Harvard University on genetically engineered, non-human
mammals containing a recombinant DNA sequence making them
susceptible to cancer. 84
A. Factor VIII:C
The blood clotting factor patents arose out of the development
by Scripps scientists of a process for purifying and concentrating
Factor VIII:C, a protein that plays an essential role in blood clot-
ting, from human and animal blood plasma.235 The patents include
claims to both the process of purifying Factor VIII:C and the
highly purified and concentrated Factor VIII:C product itself.3 6
131 US Patent No 4,361,509, 1024 Official Gazette of the US Patent & Trademark Office
1708 (Nov 30, 1982), and Reissue Patent No RE 32,011, 1059 Official Gazette 1485 (Oct 22,
1985).
133 Scripps Clinic and Research Foundation v Genentech, Inc., No. C-83-5423-WWS
(N D Cal, Nov 1983). See Scripps Clinic and Research Foundation v Genentech, Inc., 666 F
Supp 1379 (N D Cal 1987), modified in 678 F Supp 1429 (N D Cal 1988). See also 707 F
Supp 1547 (N D Cal 1989) (holding patent claims invalid).
234 US Patent No 4,736,866, 1089 Official Gazette of the US Patent & Trademark Office
703 (April 12, 1988). This is the notorious "mouse patent" that made headline news for
being the first patent issued on an animal. Keith Schneider, Harvard Gets Mouse Patent, A
World First, NY Times Al (April 13, 1988).
235 See Scripps, 666 F Supp at 1383. Factor VIII:C as it is normally found in blood is
attached to another protein known as Factor VIII:RP. The purification method developed
by the Scripps scientists involves using monoclonal antibodies to Factor VIII:RP to isolate
the Factor VIII:C/VIII:RP complexes from blood plasma and then washing the complexes
with a salt solution to break the bonds between the two proteins. Id.
Scripps extended an exclusive license under the patent to Revlon, Inc. Id at 1382.
22, Claim 1 is typical of the process claims. It reads as follows:
An improved method of preparing Factor VIII procoagulant activity protein comprising
the steps of (a) adsorbing a VIII:C/VIII:RP complex from a plasma or commercial con-
centrate source onto particles bound to a monoclonal antibody specific to VIII:RP, (b)
eluting the VIII:C, (c) adsorbing the VIII:C obtained in step (b) in another adsorption
to concentrate and further purify same, (d) eluting the adsorbed VIII:C, and (e) recov-
ering highly purified and concentrated VIII:C.
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The product claims are not limited to Factor VIII:C produced by
the patented process,23 ' but extend to Factor VIII:C of a specified
range of purity and potency however prepared. 8
Factor VIII:C occurs naturally in minute quantities in blood,
making it necessary to pool blood plasma from a large number of
donors in order to produce concentrated and purified Factor
VIII:C by the Scripps method. As a consequence, Factor VIII:C
produced by this method is expensive and carries a risk that it
harbors infectious agents such as viruses from the blood of any one
of many donors.23 9 These considerations make the protein an at-
tractive candidate for recombinant DNA production.
Scientists at Genentech began research to produce Factor
VIII:C through recombinant DNA technology before the Scripps
patent issued and continued their efforts into the patent term. 40
In the course of their research the Genentech scientists used puri-
fied Factor VIII:C prepared by the Scripps method as well as by
other methods. Although at the time of the lawsuit Genentech had
not yet produced Factor VIII:C in commercial quantities, its scien-
tists had produced small quantities of the protein in cell culture
and had purified the recombinant protein harvested from the cul-
ture through the use of antibodies. Genentech entered into a re-
search and development contract with Cutter Laboratories calling
for development of a method for commercial scale production of
recombinant Factor VIII:C for future clinical testing.
241
Scripps sued Genentech for patent infringement, seeking dam-
ages and an injunction against further use by Genentech of puri-
Id at 1385.
'17 Claim 13, which covers the purified protein produced by this process, reads as
follows:
Highly purified and concentrated human or porcine VII:C prepared in accordance
with the method of claim 1.
Id.
I 28 Claim 24, which exemplifies the breadth of coverage, reads as follows:
A human VIII:C preparation having a potency in the range of 134 to 1172 units per ml.
and being substantially free of VIII:RP.
Id.
A newly isolated, naturally occurring product may be patented if the applicant has not
merely invented a new means of producing an old product but has actually created a new
product that did not previously exist in nature in the same form. See, for example, Merck &
Co. v Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 253 F2d 156 (4th Cir 1958) (upholding validity of
patent on Vitamin B12 concentrate obtained by extraction and purification from fermenta-
tion materials, where patented product differed in its therapeutic effects from previously
available, impure Vitamin B12 obtained from liver extracts).
'39 Scripps, 666 F Supp at 1384.
240 Id.
241 Id at 1384-85.
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fled Factor VIII:C. The district court granted summary judgment
in favor of Scripps on the issue of infringement,"" although in a
subsequent decision the same court held the patent claims in-
volved in the lawsuit invalid.24 In the earlier decision finding that
the claims, if valid, were infringed, the court construed the claims
as extending to any purified Factor VIII:C regardless of the
method of its preparation. The court found that Genentech's pro-
duction of recombinant and plasma-derived Factor VIII:C in the
laboratory and use of these products in its research infringed the
patent. 44 Nonetheless, the court declined to enter a preliminary
injunction, finding that Scripps had failed to establish a reasonable
likelihood of prevailing on the issue of patent validity, and that the
public interest in the development of recombinant Factor VIII:C
argued against enjoining further research until Genentech had an
opportunity to produce evidence of invalidity.245
Genentech did not raise the experimental use defense and, in
view of its undisputed commercial purpose in pursuing the re-
search, the defense probably would not have succeeded.2 46 None-
theless, the case presents appropriate facts for a denial of injunc-
tive relief under the analysis suggested in this article. This is an
example of researchers using a patented invention to make further
progress in the same field in competition with the patent holder.
Genentech's research activities, although hostile to the commercial
.42 Id at 1389, 1395.
,,' Scripps, 707 F Supp 1547 (cited in note 233).
244 Scripps, 666 F Supp at 1389-95.
145 Id at 1401. Genentech ultimately succeeded in its challenge to the validity of the
patent claims on grounds of anticipation, inequitable conduct, and violation of the best
mode requirement. Scripps, 707 F Supp 1547.
246 Genentech instead argued, unsuccessfully, that its use of Factor VI:C fell within
the exception to infringement liability provided in 35 USC § 271(e)(1) for the use of a pat-
ented invention "solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of
information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs."
Scripps, 666 F Supp at 1395-96. See note 6 and sources cited therein. The court rejected
this argument on the ground that Genentech's use of Factor VIII:C was not solely related to
meeting FDA requirements, but also related to preparation of an application for a European
patent, performance of Genentech's agreement with Cutter Laboratories, and "marketing of
recombinant Factor VIII:C outside the United States before expiration of the Scripps pat-
ent." Id at 1396. Although Genentech has not yet begun commercial production of Factor
vI:C, it has made arrangements to produce the protein in sufficient quantities for use in
clinical trials with the ultimate goal of selling it for the treatment of hemophiliacs. Use of a
patented drug to conduct clinical trials was held to be a commercial use falling outside the
protection of the experimental use defense in Roche Products, Inc. v Bolar Pharmaceutical
Co., 733 F2d 858, 862-63 (Fed Cir 1984). Although the specific holding of this case has since
been abrogated by statute, the experimental use aspect of the decision remains intact. See
35 USC § 271(e). See also cases cited in note 8 (denying experimental use exemption where
research use was motivated by commercial purpose).
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interests of Scripps, clearly furthered the public interest in pro-
moting scientific progress. Recombinant Factor VIII:C promises to
be both cheaper and safer than Factor VIII:C purified from blood
plasma in accordance with the Scripps method. Moreover, cloning
the Factor VIII:C gene represented a significant scientific achieve-
ment. 47 But since Genentech is a research and commercial com-
petitor of the patent holder, it is unlikely that the use would be
licensed in the absence of an exemption from liability.
Since the Scripps patent claims, if valid, would have been
broad enough to cover recombinant Factor VIII:C, one might ex-
pect that Scripps would be delighted to have Genentech invest in
developing an improved method of making its patented invention
and that, conversely, Genentech would have little interest in spon-
soring such an effort without first being assured of a license under
the Scripps patent. But although the broad product claims seem to
protect Scripps from the possibility that Genentech would invent
around its patent, the invention of recombinant Factor VIII:C
nonetheless has value that both parties would like to capture for
themselves. Assuming that recombinant Factor VIII:C is a patenta-
ble improvement over the purified Factor VIII:C obtained by the
Scripps method, both Scripps and Genentech stand to benefit from
making and patenting this invention. If Genentech were able to
develop and patent recombinant Factor VIII:C first, neither
Scripps nor Genentech could make the recombinant product com-
mercially without a license from the other. Holding a patent on
recombinant Factor VIII:C would thus improve considerably
Genentech's bargaining position in negotiating with Scripps for a
license to share in the Factor VIII:C market. On the other hand, if
Scripps made the invention first, it could exploit the improved
product on its own without needing to obtain a license from
Genentech. Thus, even though Scripps's patent gives it considera-
ble protection against competitors in the Factor VIII:C market, it
might nonetheless choose to prevent Genentech from competing to
make recombinant Factor VIII:C if the patent laws permit it to do
SO.
At the same time, Genentech might be reluctant to seek a li-
cense from Scripps to pursue its research for fear of tipping its
hand to a research rival. Scripps would in all likelihood want to
know what Genentech planned to do with the invention before it
would be willing to extend a license, but once Genentech disclosed
247 Factor VIII:C was much larger than any protein previously produced through re-
combinant DNA technology. Scripps, 666 F Supp at 1384.
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its plans to Scripps, Scripps could pursue the research on its own,
depriving Genentech of the rewards of its own ingenuity.
Moreover, even with broad patent claims Scripps might not be
sure that the claims would be held valid in litigation or that
Genentech would not manage to invent around the patent, thereby
destroying its monopoly position. The distinction between research
that will yield improvements falling within the scope of patent
claims and research that will yield alternative technologies falling
outside the scope of the claims is difficult to draw in advance, and
patent holders who have the power to enjoin the use of their inven-
tions in research in the same field might play it safe by forbidding
all such research. Moreover, the scope of patent claims is often un-
certain until the claims are construed in litigation. Genentech
made a colorable, although unsuccessful, argument that recombi-
nant Factor VIII:C did not fall within the scope of the patent
claims, and ultimately succeeded in having the claims that it was
charged with infringing declared invalid.2 48 Thus even if one could
foresee in advance the likely outcome of a research project in the
field of a patented invention, it still might not be possible to deter-
mine with any certainty whether that outcome could be exploited
without infringing the patent claims. This uncertainty would add
to the difficulties of negotiating a license.
It might seem wasteful to have Scripps and Genentech scien-
tists competing to develop recombinant Factor VIII:C. But since
we know with the benefit of hindsight that Genentech made the
improvement first, its efforts obviously were not entirely redun-
dant to those of Scripps and its licensees. The district court ac-
knowledged the public interest in rapid development of recombi-
nant Factor VIII:C in declining to enter a preliminary injunction
against Genentech. One can only speculate as to how much longer
the public would have to wait for this and other improvements to
patented inventions if patent holders could block their rivals from
competing with them in research. Given that patent holders have
an interest in prolonging the period of the public's dependence on
patented technologies and given the difficulty of foreseeing the
outcome of future research projects in the fields of patented inven-
tions, it seems imprudent to place this power in the hands of pat-
ent holders.
Inasmuch as the court ultimately held all of the claims at issue
in the lawsuit invalid, Scripps did not obtain any remedy at all. On
214 Scripps, 707 F Supp 1547 (N D Cal 1989).
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the other hand, had the court upheld the validity of claims cover-
ing the recombinant Factor VIII:C, it would not have been neces-
sary to award damages for Genentech's use of the patented inven-
tion in research, since Scripps's interests could be protected
adequately by allowing it to enforce its patent against Genentech
at the commercial exploitation stage. A more difficult question
would have been presented if the court had upheld the validity of
claims that were infringed only at the research stage, while holding
invalid any claims that would still be infringed at the stage of com-
mercial exploitation. For example, suppose the court had upheld
the validity of Scripps's claims to its process of purifying Factor
VIII:C-a process which Genentech had used only in its re-
search-and had held invalid the product claims that would have
covered the recombinant product that Genentech planned to sell
commercially. In that case it might have been appropriate to award
damages to Scripps for the research use in order to ensure that
Scripps captured a fair share of the value that its validly patented
process contributed to Genentech's research.
B. Transgenic Mammals
The transgenic mammals patent arose out of the development
by scientists at Harvard University of a mouse that was genetically
altered with a human cancer gene.24 9 As a result of this genetic
alteration, the mouse is unusually susceptible to developing breast
cancer. Harvard has granted an exclusive license under the patent
to duPont Co. to produce transgenic mice for use in research. 50
DuPont recently announced that it plans to begin marketing trans-
genic mice to cancer researchers in nonprofit and government labo-
ratories next year. The mice will sell for approximately $50 each.2 51
In this case the claimed invention is primarily a research tool,
9 Although the specific embodiment of the invention achieved by the Harvard scien-
tists was a transgenic mouse, the scope of the patent claims is not limited to transgenic
mice. Claim 1 of the patent reads as follows:
A transgenic non-human mammal all of whose germ cells and somatic cells contain a
recombinant activated oncogene sequence introduced into said mammal, or an ancestor
of said mammal, at an embryonic stage.
US Patent No 4,736,866, at 9-10 (cited in note 234). Other claims define the invention more
narrowly, limiting it to transgenic "rodents" or "mice." The breadth of claim I brings a wide
range of possible subsequent advances in the field of transgenic mammals within the scope
of the patent monopoly.
250 Telephone interview with Joyce Brinton, Harvard University Office of Patents,
Copyrights & Licensing, April 18, 1988.
'l DuPont Co. to Sell Gene-Spliced Mice to Scientists in Labs Studying Cancer, Wall
St J B5 (Nov 16, 1988).
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to be produced commercially for sale to researchers. The trans-
genic mice have a variety of uses in research. They could serve as
living models for studying the cancer-causing or cancer-inhibiting
effects of various agents, or for studying the mechanisms by which
genes contribute to the development of cancer. They might also be
useful to scientists trying to design other transgenic mammals.
Researchers who are using transgenic mice to study cancer are
potential customers for the patented invention. If such users were
exempt from the patent monopoly, it would be difficult for
Harvard and duPont to extract royalties from a significant seg-
ment of the market for the patented invention. Researchers might
still choose to buy the duPont mice rather than making their own,
especially if there are economies of scale that make duPont a more
efficient producer. But if researchers were free to make the mice on
their own, duPont would be limited to charging no more than the
cost to researchers of making the mice in their own laboratories.
This could potentially restrict the monopoly profits to be made
from the patent and thereby undermine patent incentives.
Denying these researchers an exemption from infringement li-
ability is unlikely to deprive them of the use of transgenic mice in
their research. They will simply have to pay the price that duPont
charges for the mice.2 52  DuPont will want to sell to these
users-they fall squarely within the market for the patented inven-
tion. The experimental use exemption should not permit ordinary
consumption of a patented invention by research users without a
license from the patent holder.
On the other hand, researchers in the transgenic mammals
field who are trying to design a better transgenic laboratory mam-
mal, or a transgenic mammal that does not infringe the patent,
should not need to negotiate for a license before they can proceed
with their research,2 5 although they might be held liable for dam-
'"2 A more compelling case for an experimental use exemption might be presented in
the case of a research technology invention that is not available by license. For example,
suppose Harvard were to decide to give its own researchers exclusive access to transgenic
mammals as a research tool. In this case, as in the case of research in the field of the pat-
ented invention, the patent holder sees research users primarily as competitors rather than
as consumers. When this happens, it is at least arguable that some sort of experimental use
exemption may be necessary to prevent patent holders from using their monopolies to block
the technological progress of their rivals.
z"" If duPont made the mice readily available to all researchers on the same terms,
there might be no need to exempt competitive researchers from the patent monopoly. On
the other hand, researchers studying how to make transgenic mammals might have legiti-
mate research reasons for wanting to make the mammals themselves, or they might want to
make mammals that are different from those sold by duPont, but nonetheless fall within the
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ages after the fact. Such research is comparable to the efforts of
Genentech to develop recombinant Factor VIII:C and should not
be subject to the control of the patent holder for the reasons out-
lined above.2 54 Patent holders should not be able to enjoin the use
of their inventions in subsequent research in the same field by
their rivals.
V. CONCLUSION
The patent system aims to promote scientific and technologi-
cal progress by granting exclusive rights in new discoveries. But
the enforcement of these exclusive rights against subsequent re-
searchers can sometimes interfere with further progress in the field
of the invention. The literature in the sociology, history, and phi-
losophy of science offers a number of reasons for believing that free
access to prior discoveries by subsequent researchers might be a
more effective means of promoting progress. In some respects these
two perspectives on how best to promote progress are irreconcila-
ble, with each perspective making sense in its own distinct sphere
of basic or applied research. But as the line between basic and ap-
plied research becomes blurred in certain fields, patent protection
increasingly threatens to encroach on the domain of research sci-
ence, making it necessary to work out an accommodation between
the two perspectives. A carefully formulated experimental use ex-
emption from patent infringement liability is an important first
step in that direction.
broad scope of the patent claims.
2'4 See notes 235-48 and accompanying text.
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